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Introduction
What distinguishes war conducted by a state from war conducted by its ene-
mies-one fights in accordance with the law, and the other fights in contra-
vention of the law. The moral strength and substantive justification for the
authorities' war depend completely on compliance with the laws of the state:
in waiving this strength and this justification for its war, the authorities
serve the purposes of the enemy. The moral weapon is no less important
than any other weapon, and perhaps even surpasses it-and there is no more
effective moral weapon than the rule of law.
1
Since its establishment, the State of Israel has been subject to inces-
sant terrorist attacks. Streets, buses, and places of mass entertainment
transformed in the blink of an eye into fields of death is not the scene of a
nightmare but a daily reality. The cost of terrorism is unbearable. The
lives of thousands of innocent civilians have been brutally cut short, and
the existence of tens of thousands of injured men and women has been
changed unrecognizably; the Israeli experience is suffused with bereave-
ment, pain, frustration and anger. Coping with the constant fear of immi-
nent terrorist attacks imprints its own indelible mark on every aspect of
daily life, political, cultural, social and economic.
On September 11, 2001, the full force of terror struck at the heart of
the United States. The sights were familiar to Israel, as was the profound
sense of shock that swept over the American people. History will not
record the attack of September 1 lth as the first hostile action taken against
the American people; however, in terms of the number of victims, the
extent of the destruction, the methods by which it was carried out, and the
degree of defiance it exposed, it was an assault more threatening than any
that had preceded it. It led the President of the United States to declare war
against terrorist organizations throughout the world2 and it inspired his
allies to join him.
What measures may a democratic state properly take to protect itself
in times of emergency? Clearly, not every measure is permissible. Both in
times of peace and in times of crisis, it is the legal norms that set the
boundaries for what is permissible and what is prohibited. Although the
1. High Court of Justice [H.C.] 320/80 Kawasma v. Minister of Defense, 35(3) P.D.
113, 132 (Heb.).
2. U.S. President George Bush's speech before Congress and the American people,
delivered on September 20, 2001, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/09/20010920-8.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2003).
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law does not fall silent in times of war, it may occasionally permit a devia-
tion from the legal norms applicable in times of peace. In its hour of crisis
a state is not required to sacrifice itself on the altar of the basic rights and
freedoms of its citizens but is entitled to restrict these rights and freedoms
as is necessary to effectively deal with its enemies:
There is no choice-in a democratic society seeking freedom and security
but to create a balance between freedom and dignity on one hand and secur-
ity on the other. Human rights cannot become an excuse for denying public
and state security. A balance is needed-a sensitive and difficult balance-
between the freedom and dignity of the individual and state and public
security.
3
The real, and perhaps most difficult, test of a democratic state lies in
its ability to draw a proper balance between these two competing values,
which will prevent the imposition of avoidable restrictions on individual
liberties.
Finding this balance is not an easy task. Difficult legal questions are
accompanied by a number of moral dilemmas. This Article is not con-
cerned with finding the proper fundamental balance between the interest
of national security on one hand and the entire range of individual liberties
and rights on the other; rather, it is concerned with identifying the balance
between national security and a human being's fundamental right to
privacy.
A terrorist attack cannot be defined solely as the accomplishment of
the terrorist's aspirations. A terrorist act is the completed external expres-
sion of a catalogue of preliminary activities-planning, preparatory work,
financing, training, and qualification-clandestinely carried out by the ter-
rorists while exploiting the state's lack of watchfulness over activities car-
ried out in the realm of its citizens' private lives.
Accordingly, it is easy to understand why, after every attack, and more
compellingly after an attack that produces multiple casualties, the question
that echoes in every quarter is why the intelligence services failed to iden-
tify those preliminary activities: Was it because the modern surveillance
measures were not sufficiently sophisticated? Was it because, despite the
availability of sophisticated intelligence devices, constitutional restrictions
prevented their use? Or was it perhaps that, despite the efficacy of the
measures and the absence of constitutional obstacles to their implementa-
tion, the intelligence personnel were simply negligent in the performance
of their duties?
History teaches us that the erosion in the public's sense of personal
safety brought about by the sights of carnage and destruction, combined
with feelings of pain, anger, and the desire for revenge, generally lead the
public to assign the blame for the tragedy to the constitutional restrictions
and therefore to conclude that those restrictions must be removed and a
new balance drawn between human rights and the public interest in
3. Further Hearing [FHI 7048/97 Anon. v. Minister of Defense, 54(1) P.D. 721,
743 (Heb.).
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national security. Alexander Hamilton eloquently expressed this public
feeling as follows:
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national con-
duct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates.
The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual
effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel
nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to insti-
tutions which have a tendency to destroy their civilian and political rights.
To be safer, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.
4
However, history also teaches that after the security crisis has passed,
it generally becomes evident that there was no rational factual basis for
sacrificing rights in favor of security needs and that the lifting of the con-
stitutional restrictions was no more than the emotional product of panic,
paranoia, and fear.
5
What, therefore, is the proper rational balance that must be drawn
between protection of the privacy of the citizens of a state on one hand and
the security interest in invading the public's privacy on the other, which
would allow the security authorities to identify those few who would
exploit the right to privacy to plan and execute acts of terror?
The trail I shall follow to identify this balance begins in Part II, which
is devoted to clarifying the legal and moral importance of the two compet-
ing values: I shall look both at the difficulty in defining and clearly
delineating the boundaries of these values and at their justification and
significance in a democratic society. In Part III, I shall review the various
ways that are available to invade the private life of an individual, beginning
with traditional human detective methods and ending with a range of sur-
veillance technologies, which are daily becoming more complex and
sophisticated. In Part IV, I shall examine Israeli law on these issues and in
Part V, I shall turn to a comparative analysis of the legal arrangements
applied in the United States, Canada, England, and the European Union,
placing special emphasis on the legal changes that followed the terrorist
attack of September 2001. Part VI, which concludes this article, examines
the constitutionality of the various countries' arrangements from a compar-
ative perspective and cautions against the dangers entailed by extreme and
irrational legal responses.
I. The Moral and Legal Nature of the Clash Between the Right to
Privacy and National Security Interests
A. The Right to Privacy
At all times, in every society, the individual desires to maintain a cer-
tain amount of distance from the rest of society; the cultural relativism of
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 67 (Alexander Hamilton) (1961).
5. WJ. Brennan, The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times of
Security Crises in NATIONAL SECURITY AND FREE SPEECH (Kluwer, Sh. Shetreet, ed., 1989).
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societies influencing societies' character. 6 Notwithstanding, or perhaps
because privacy is such a deeply rooted value in human culture, the vast
literature in this field teaches us that it is one of those concepts that every-
one understands but that cannot be defined in an objective and descriptive
way that clearly expresses the scope of its application. 7 In fact, over the
years, numerous efforts have been made to define the term. The most
important and influential definitions may generally be placed in one of
three categories: 8 first, privacy is defined with the aid of the concept of
moral rights and claims. Thus, for example, it is described as the right of
the individual to be left alone, 9 as a claim to freedom to decide in what
circumstances and to what extent information about the person will be
divulged to others 1° and, as a corollary, the person's right to live part of his
life far away from the prying eyes of the public." Second, privacy is
defined in terms of control. Among other things, it is described as the
individual's control over the dissemination of information about himself,12
his control over the quantity and quality of the information concerning
himself that is made known to others, 13 his control over his body, his place
of residence, his identity and information about himself,1 4 and his control
over the extent of the public's knowledge of his private affairs. 15 Third,
privacy is defined in terms of accessibility. Thus, for example, it is
described as that which prevents the unwanted access of the public to the
individual on three levels: the level of secrecy (access of the public to infor-
mation concerning the individual), the level of segregation (access of the
public to the body and premises of the individual), and the level of ano-
nymity (physical-as opposed to mental-attention of the public to the
individual). 16
The grounds for privacy are instrumental in nature and are twofold: 17
on the individual level, privacy plays a central, and sometimes critical, role
in realizing the aspirations, desires, hopes and goals of the individual.
6. For an extensive anthropological review, see A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 13
(5th ed. 1968).
7. J.C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY AND ISOLATION 3 (1992).
8. F.D. Schoeman, Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature in PHILOSOPHI-
CAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 2-4 (F.D. Schoeman ed., 1984) (hereinafter
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS).
9. Privacy is "[tihe right to be let alone," in the words of Warren and Brandeis,
adopting the expression coined by Judge T. Cooley. See S. Warren & L. Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
10. WESTIN, supra note 6, at 7.
11. M.C. SLOUGH, PRIVACY, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 3 (1969).
12. A.R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 25 (1971).
13. C. Fried, Privacy (A Moral Analysis), in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8,
at 210.
14. D. MCLEAN, PRIVACY AND ITS INVASION 49 (1995) (quoting Robert Ellis Smith's
definition).
15. H. Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, in PRIVACY 169 (.R. Pennock and J.W. Chap-
man eds., 1971).
16. R. Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980); S. BoK,
SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 11 (1982).
17. CJ. BENNETT & R. GRANT, VISIONS OF PRIVACY: POLICY CHOICES FOR THE DIGITAL
AGE 101-03 (1999).
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First, privacy is an essential condition to formulating the individual's per-
sonality: 18 the ability of a person to comprehend the uniqueness of his
existence relative to the existence of other people is dependent on his
capacity to personally experience physical and psychological events and
thereby conceive his separateness from the whole. Second, privacy is an
expression of human dignity: 19 open invasion of a person's privacy com-
pels him to plan his actions while taking into account the public that has
been forced on him and that judges those actions. Clandestine invasion of
his privacy changes the state of affairs on the basis of which he acts and
prevents him from making considered behavioral choices in the light of
existing objective circumstances. In both situations, lack of respect for the
individual's desire to distance himself from others (in the absence of justi-
fiable reasons) expresses disrespect for him. Third, privacy is an essential
condition for the creation of interpersonal relations, in general, and deeper
relations based on feelings of love, friendship, trust, and respect, in
particular.
20
Accepted social mores dictate the type and scope of participation in
information that is appropriate to the different types of relations con-
ducted by people. Without privacy, everyone has the same quantity and
quality of knowledge concerning a person, with the result that he will not
be able to create different relationships on different strata. Deep relation-
ships rely on the individual exposing certain facets of his personality to the
other party to the relationship. Lack of privacy prevents him from conceal-
ing these facets from the outset and thereby prevents him from creating a
relationship that is separate from and deeper than those relations he nor-
mally has with the public at large.
Fourth, privacy is an essential condition for intimacy.21 A person who
participates in an intimate experience submerges himself in it, whereas an
inherent aspect of an onlooker's perception is the sense of relative detach-
ment from the event that is being observed. Awareness of the presence or
the possible presence of an uncalled for spectator, compels a person to
examine his acts from the perspective of the onlooker, and the detachment
caused thereby prevents him from plunging into the intimate experience.
Fifth, privacy helps an individual to concentrate, to be calm, and to refrain
from criticism and ridicule2 2 because, as noted, the absence of uncalled for
observers frees a person from the distraction inherent in being watched;
privacy will make it easier for the person to remain calm and concentrate
on the range of creative human activities, by virtue of which he can enrich
his spiritual world, acquire knowledge and skills, and develop his intellec-
18. J.H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS,
supra note 8, at 310.
19. S.I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS,
supra note 8, at 223-44.
20. J. Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS, id., at 290.
Fried, supra note 13, at 205.
21. R.S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8,
at 265-71.
22. Gavison, supra note 16, at 446-48; MCLEAN, supra note 14, at 76.
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tual abilities. Sixth, privacy is important for the mental health of the indi-
vidual. 23 In the absence of the capacity to perform acts that are known
only to him, a person is forced to continuously conform to social stan-
dards, as any deviation from those standards will attract social condemna-
tion. The inhibitions and isolation entailed by this may cause the person
psychological harm.
On the collective level, privacy plays a critical role in shaping the char-
acter of society. True, in the absence of privacy, many wrongful, fraudu-
lent, and hypocritical acts worldwide might not have been committed, and,
moreover, the proponents of the communitarian theory question the truth
of the liberal ideal to the effect that the individual is an island able to form
his personality in isolation from the society in which he lives, and argue
that a surplus of privacy impairs his ability to form an independent person-
ality. Yet, the individualistic grounds for privacy make it clear that the
essential contribution privacy makes to the formulation of the personal
autonomy of the individual, and consequently to the existence of the demo-
cratic regime, has a positive value that considerably outweighs its negative
aspects. 2 4 Recognition of the individual as a complex separate entity wor-
thy of respect enables the individual to develop a personality possessing
independent moral judgment. A society whose members possess conform-
ist personalities based on submissive acceptance of social norms does not
enable the pursuit of the pluralism necessary to create the democratic
experience.
When we speak of the legal right to privacy we are referring to the
legal protection of privacy. The scope of application of the right envelops
the positive aspects of privacy, as these are disclosed by the justifications
given for the right. Consequently, to define the legal right to privacy, it is
necessary to agree on a definition of the concept of privacy, which will
allow us to determine the scope of its application and thereafter its positive
aspects. 25 In my opinion, the superior definition is the one that is based
on the notion of accessibility, as contrary to the first definition, which is
based on the moral importance of privacy but which does not set out what
is embraced thereby, and contrary to the second definition, which is based
on the notion of control over information but which does not recognize the
fact that control is not a guarantee of privacy; 26 this definition eloquently
expresses the diverse strands of privacy, which are not necessarily interde-
pendent. When we speak about the level of secrecy, we are referring to the
public's access to information about the individual (such as accessing his
photograph, monitoring his conversations, and data banks that contain
information about him); when we talk of the level of segregation, we are
23. S.M. Jourard, Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
307 (1966); Benn, supra note 19, at 241.
24. See WESTIN, supra note 6, at 23; Benn, supra note 19, at 241; Schoeman, supra
note 8, at 1; Gavison, supra note 16, at 443, 449, 455; Y. Livnat, Individual and Commu-
nity- Communitarian Criticism of HCJ 205/94 Nof v. Ministry of Defense, 31(1) MISHPA-
TIM 219, 223-33 (2000) (Heb.).
25. Gavison, supra note 16, at 459.
26. Schoeman, supra note 8, at 3.
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referring to the public's physical access to the individual (such as searches
of his body and property); and when we talk about the level of anonymity,
we are referring to the public directing its attention to the individual (such
as through surveillance).
The justifications given for privacy show that neither the complete
absence of privacy nor absolute privacy is desirable. It follows that identi-
fying the positive aspects of privacy, i.e., those aspects that should properly
be accorded legal protection, requires a balance to be drawn between the
two polar extremes mentioned. A balance is not designed in a vacuum, but
in the light of the system of values on which the legal system of a particular
country is founded. 27 In other words, the greater the commitment of soci-
ety to the liberal ideal, the more extensive will be the legal protection
accorded to privacy and vice versa. A discussion of the appropriate struc-
ture of values is outside the scope of this paper; suffice it to say that a
proper balance is one that properly reflects a democratic society's commit-
ment to human rights. There is no doubt that in every such balance, fac-
tors such as preventing the creation of data banks, preventing filming and
monitoring of an individual's conversations, preventing interference with
his body and property, and preventing surveillance of his movements, will
be regarded as positive and therefore worthy of legal protection.28
At the same time, the range of situations falling within the boundaries
of the right to privacy is not homogenous, in view of the varying relative
weight that may be accorded to the justifications for granting protection in
each of those situations.2 9 Thus, it may be said that falling within the core
right to privacy are the situations that lie at the heart of the right because
the justifications for including them in the right have the greatest force;
consequently, it is anticipated that infringement of privacy in those situa-
tions will cause the individual the greatest damage and pain. We are refer-
ring here to situations that the individual experiences alone, in the hope
that none other than himself knows of them, unless he chooses to reveal
them. Situations falling on the intermediate level of the right are those
where the justifications for including them are weaker, and therefore it is
anticipated that an infringement of privacy will cause the individual great
pain and damage, albeit less than what he would have experienced had his
core right to privacy been affected. The situations we are referring to here
are experiences that the individual shares with a small and defined number
of other individuals. On the fringe of the right to privacy are situations, the
inclusion of which can only be justified weakly, and therefore infringement
of privacy in those situations will only lead to a low level of pain and dam-
27. Livnat, supra note 24, at 243-44.
28. It should be clarified that recognition of the legal right to privacy does not mean
that in every case where the right clashes with other rights and interests it will override.
Recognition of the right is only an essential preliminary condition for its identification
as a relevant element in situations where it clashes with other rights and interests and
where, therefore, a need arises to draw a balance between all the interests. For further
elaboration of this point, see Gavison, supra note 16, at 467.
29. Benn, supra note 19, at 234; R. A. Wasserstorm, Privacy: Some Arguments and
Assumptions, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8, at 317.
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age to the individual. These situations are experiences that the individual
shares with a large, but defined, number of other individuals.
B. The National Security Interest
The path described in relation to the right to privacy will now be
applied to the discussion concerning the substance of the national security
interest. The concept "national security," like the concept "privacy," is
amorphous and devoid of precise analytical meaning. Its scope of applica-
tion is not limited solely to situations in which the state defends itself
against an illegal domestic or foreign threat of force to its institutions or to
the people present within its borders, even though this is the heart of the
concept. Rather, it embraces a range of situations that influence the ability
of the regime to effectively pursue the collective welfare of the nation.
30
Thus, for example, while at the periphery of the concept one may find
governmental actions in the spheres of education and transport, at its core
one may find military war-like acts and anti-terrorist activities.
National security is a public resource, the justifications for which are
readily understood, because there is no more essential collective national
goal than preserving national security, safeguarding the lives of the citizens
and ensuring public order.3 ' Security is an essential condition for achiev-
ing these objectives, and without it no significance can be attached to
human rights and the other individual and collective interests.
3 2
The national security interest delineates the scope of the legal protec-
tion of national security and embraces the security aspects for which justi-
fication is found on national security grounds. Contrary to privacy,
absolute security is the utopian ideal, and therefore "national security" as a
whole is worthy of legal protection 33 in the sense that the state has the
duty and the right to protect itself and the persons who are located within
its borders against security threats. 3 4 In this paper I shall confine myself to
one of the core aspects of the security interest-that which deals with the
duty and the right of the state to protect itself against domestic and foreign
terror attacks.
35
30. T.I. Emerson, National Security and Civil Liberties, 9 YALEJ. WORLD PUB. ORD. 78,
79 (1982).
31. G. Barzilai, Center Versus Periphery: "Anti-Terrorist Laws" as Politics, 8 PLILIM
229, 230 (2000) (Heb.); Emerson, supra note 30, at 80.
32. 1. Zamir, Human Rights and National Security, 19 MISHPATIM 17 (1989) (Heb.).
33. These comments are made by way of analogy to the analysis offered by Professor
Gavison in relation to the right to privacy. See Gavison, supra note 16, at 440, 459.
34. Assa Casher, MILITARY ETHICs 37-39 (3d ed. 1998) (Heb.).
35. Many definitions have been given to the word "terror"; however, none are incisive
and authoritative. For the purpose of this discussion we may be satisfied with use of the
term to describe the deliberate performance or threat of performance of acts of physical
violence or menacing persons who are not combatants, to achieve any particular pur-
pose, generally a political goal. Law enforcement bodies which lawfully employ force to
maintain public order and random acts of violence do not comprise acts of terror, even
though formally speaking they may fall within certain of its elements. For a discussion
about the nature of terror and who is a terrorist, see E. Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling
Cornell International Law Journal
C. The Right to Privacy Versus the National Security Interest
A key condition for conducting an intelligent discussion of these
issues is an understanding of the fundamental concepts involved therein.
As the concepts of privacy and national security are difficult to define,
there is an inherent risk that they will be perceived on an intuitive non-
rational level, which will undermine the ability to conduct a pertinent dis-
cussion of the proper balance that should be drawn between these values
in the event of a clash.3 6 Thus, when on one hand we are witnesses to
concrete atrocities, scenes of streets and malls transformed into arenas of
death, and on the other we are faced with an abstract right, our intuition
tilts the balance unequivocally in favor of national security. To enable a
discussion of the legal and moral aspects of the proper balance between the
right to privacy and the national security interest, in so far as relates to the
war against terror, the two earlier subsections were devoted to a clarifica-
tion of these concepts.
At this point I shall turn to an examination of the ways in which the
right to privacy may be infringed.
II. Means of Infringing the Right to Privacy
If, in the beginning of the 20th century, there were those who believed
that there was nothing left to invent,3 7 the technological developments of
this century proved to the skeptics that mankind remains engaged in the
incessant pursuit of boundless innovations and inventions. The further
our progress in this pursuit, the more aware we become that those innova-
tions that improve the quality of our lives also have the potential to inter-
fere with areas of our life that were once inaccessible to anyone but
ourselves. Knowledge of what is being done in these spheres of life, in so
far as they are exploited to plan acts of terror, is often what enables us to
foil these terrorist acts. However, the situation is much more complex than
it seems because identifying the areas of life relevant to terrorism entails
interfering with the privacy of the entire public. How can we catch a terror-
ist carrying an explosive belt without x-raying the bodies of all passengers
on a plane? How can we uncover a terrorist cell whose members communi-
cate via electronic media, without uncovering the contents of their commu-
nications and at the same time scanning the innocent communications of
millions of people? And how should we identify a terrorist collecting intel-
ligence regarding security procedures in a tourist site or shopping mall,
without placing surveillance cameras that not only film suspicious activi-
ties but also the activities of innocent people?
Terrorism: The Balance Between the Right of a Democracy to Defend Itself and the Protection
of Human Rights, 6 UCLAJ. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 89, 97-101 (2001).
36. MCLEAN, supra note 14, at 3; Zamir, supra note 32, at 18.
37. In 1899 Charles Duell, the U.S. Commissioner of Patents, argued that
"[e]verything that can be invented has been invented." See W. Isaacson, Who Mattered
and Why, at http://www.time.com/time/timelOO/poc/magazine/who-mattered and_
why4d.html (last visited July 27, 2003).
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A. Human Detectives
Privacy may be invaded in a wide variety of ways. Human detectives
have been at work since time immemorial. 38 There are clear benefits to be
gained by surveillance of the activities of a person suspected of terrorist
activities, searching his person and property (sometimes with the aid of
dogs trained to sniff out explosives), interrogating those in contact with the
suspect, and maintaining proximity to eavesdrop into his conversations.
Yet, the limitations inherent in human surveillance-the fact that it entails
the allocation of enormous human and economic resources, the fact that it
is dependent on the skills and expertise of the persons performing the sur-
veillance, and the difficulty in disguising the trackers and the risks they
face-has led over the years to a decrease in the use of individuals and
greater reliance on technological surveillance measures.
3 9
B. Technological Surveillance Measures
Technological surveillance measures may be divided into five
categories:
1. Technologies for Scanning Communications
Visual surveillance is carried out by positioning closed circuit televi-
sion cameras in public places (such as on the street or at bus stops) or in
private places (such as in houses and vehicles), which relay live pictures to
a control center. Advances in optical technologies have resulted in sharper
picture resolution and night time pictures that resemble daylight pictures
in quality, thereby enabling the control center team to carry out close prox-
imity filming of suspicious articles. 40 Visual documentation has multiple
advantages, including assisting the identification of terrorists seeking an
"ideal" place to carry out a suicide bombing or conceal an explosive pack-
age as well as spot collaborators engaged in collecting intelligence for
future terrorist attacks. Likewise, documentation produced during the
occurrence of a "successful" terrorist event enables the security forces to
determine the nature of the security flaws, which can then be rectified so
as to avoid similar future attacks. Audio surveillance is carried out by
means of audio tape devices or telephone taps.4 1 Electronic wiretapping
38. N. Rakover, Protection of Privacy 17, in 4 SERIES OF STUDIES AND REVIEWS IN JEWISH
LAW (Ministry of Justice 1970).
39. L.D. Sloan, Echelon and the Legal Restraints on Signals Intelligence: A Need for
Reevaluation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1467, 1474 (2001); M.G. Young, What Big Eyes and Ears You
Have! A New Regime for Covert Governmental Surveillance, FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1035
(2001).
40. C. Slobogin, Symposium: Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and
the Right to Anonymity, 72 Miss. LJ. 213, 219-22 (2002).
41. Apart from eavesdropping into the content of telephone conversations, it is pos-
sible to tap identifying details, i.e., to record the telephone numbers dialed from a partic-
ular telephone number (by means of a device known as a pen register), the telephone
numbers calling in (by means of a trap and trace device), as well as the time and dura-
tion of the call. See Young, supra note 39, at 1024-32; 1 C.S. FISHMAN & A.T. McKENNA,
WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING 5:11 at 5-15, 5-16 (2d ed. 1995).
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can be carried out by a range of devices. In relation to the internet, the
best known tool is the American Carnivore program, which is able to scan
the internet transmissions of all the subscribers of a provider upon whose
server the program is installed and register identities (i.e., record the
internet sites visited by the surfer, the email addresses of the surfer, and
those of his contacts) as well as register the content (record the activities of
the surfer in the internet sites visited by him-such as purchases at a public
online auction, information sought using a search engine, and the contents
of his communications) of transmissions that fall within certain defined
parameters. 4 2 Scanning internet transmissions enables the security
authorities to track individual terrorist suspects, as well as to engage in
more general surveillance aimed at identifying user practices or cyber com-
munications characteristic of terrorists. However, a terrorist who is aware
of the possibility of electronic tapping can adopt a variety of measures to
camouflage his activities, such as using encryption programs that convert
his electronic communications into indecipherable code.43  All the
addressee need do is tap in the password of the appropriate decoding pro-
gram while the security authority is forced to try and breach the encryp-
tion program-a complex and time-consuming process that is often
impossible. The solution to this problem is a program installed on the
computer of the sender or receiver of the communication, which records all
the key strokes typed by someone using an operating computer (including
the password of the encryption program) and then sends the information
to a defined email address. Installation of the program (known as Key-
Logger) may be performed manually-which requires physical access to
the computer-or by means of a virus (known as Magic Lantern) that is
operated when a person opens an email attachment or visits a certain
site. 
4 4
Reports that have not yet been officially confirmed also tell of the exis-
tence of an intelligence gathering project known as Echelon, which scans
all the types of electronic communications described above and filters and
records information meeting particular parameters.4 5
42. The Carnivore program underwent three rhetorical cycles: the FBI began devel-
oping it in 1997 under the name "Omnivore" (eater of everything); in 1999 the name
was changed to "Carnivore" (meat eater); however, because both names had an immedi-
ate negative connotation, in 2001 the program was given a neutral technical name-
Digital Collection System 1000 (DCS-1000). Since Carnivore was the name which took
hold in the public mind, I too shall refer to the program in that way. T.R. McCarthy,
Don't Fear Carnivore: It Won't Devour Individual Privacy, 66 Mo. L. REV. 827, 827-35
(2001); K.A. Horn, Privacy Versus Protection: Exploring the Boundaries of Electronic Sur-
veillance in the Internet Age, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2233, 2234-36 (2002).
43. J.T. Stender, Too Many Secrets: Challenges to the Control of Strong Crypto and the
National Security Perspective, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 287, 293-97 (1998).
44. A. Nance, Taking the Fear Out of Electronic Surveillance in the New Age of Terror,
70 UMKC L. REV. 751, 755-57, 768-70 (2002).
45. According to reports, the project is being operated by the United States, England,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Sloan, supra note 39, at 1470-72.
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2. Technologies for Enhancing the Quality of Information Obtained by
Natural Senses
Normal enhancement refers to information that the human senses are
capable of discerning without technological assistance (for example, binoc-
ulars, telescopes, night vision glasses and satellite photographs improve the
quality of information obtained visually), whereas abnormal enhancement
refers to information that the human senses are not capable of discerning
without technological assistance. 46 Thus, metal detectors enable the detec-
tion of metal weapons concealed under clothing or in baggage. The ther-
mal imager detects the infrared heat waves emitted by every object and
presents them as a visual image colored according to the degree of heat of
the object, while advanced devices are even able to detect heat waves
through closed walls. 47 It is possible to make use of this imager not only to
detect traditional weapons and explosives on the body or in the property of
a person but also when rescuing hostages, as it is capable of revealing the
location of the terrorists and their physical condition at any given moment.
The passive millimeter wave imager detects electromagnetic radiation natu-
rally emitted by objects and presents them as high resolution images,
which, inter alia, allow the contours of a person to be detected through his
clothes or baggage (such as weapons or explosives but also pens and
coins). 48 The radar skin scanner produces even more precise images,
which allow any object larger than a millimeter to be detected and conse-
quently reveal the most intimate details of a person.4 9 Likewise, a broad
range of x-ray cameras image the naked body of a person through his
clothes at different levels of resolution, the most advanced of these cameras
providing an image that leaves no room for the imagination.5 0 At the same
time, these devices may be equipped with accessories that reduce the
degree of infringement to a person's privacy, such as accessories that dis-
tort the face of the subject or systems that are programmed not to show the
operator an image save if it detects items that have the shape of weapons or
explosives.
5 1
3. Technologies for Mapping Location
An electronic tracking device, generally called a beeper, is a miniature
radio transmitter that broadcasts signals on a cyclical basis. The signals
46. T.W. McKnight, Passive, Sensory-Enhanced Searches: Shifting the Fourth Amend-
ment "Reasonableness" Burden, 59 LA. L. REV. 1243 (1999).
47. Id. at 1249; Young, supra note 39, at 1033-34.
48. A.L. Rosenberg, Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging: A New Weapon in the Fight
Against Crime or a Fourth Amendment Violation?, 9 ALB. LJ. Sci. & TECH. 135, 138-40
(1998).
49. A.M. Froomkin, Symposium: Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm? The
Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1500 (2000).
50. Id.; transcript of an interview with David Sobell and John Mica, aired on June 26,
2003, at http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0306/26/se.02.html (last visited July
27, 2003).
51. Id.; S.S. Flores, Gun Detector Technology and the Special Needs Exception, 25
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 135, 139 (1999).
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are received by a compatible device, which maps its location and conse-
quently the movements of the object in which it is placed. So long as the
beeper remains within the range of the mapping device, the tracked object
cannot be lost. In cases where the beeper moves out of range, it is easier to
relocate it than in the case of physical tracking.5 2 Technologically more
sophisticated tracking procedures enable the operator to ascertain the loca-
tion of a person by means of the cellular telephone he carries, by mapping
the cyclical signals broadcast by every cellular telephone linked to a com-
munications network.53
4. Identification Technologies
Identification technologies such as passwords and magnetic cards are
not reliable means of identifying people, as these can be borrowed or sto-
len.5 4 Biometric measures, however, identify the individual on the basis of
unique non-transferable physical characteristics. 55 Thus, DNAfingerprint-
ing5 6 allows the molecular structure of a person to be identified and then
converted into a digital code. This technique is highly reliable5 7 because
apart from identical twins, each person has a unique DNA fingerprint.
With retinal scanning58 a light beam scans the blood cells in the eye and
converts the data into a digital code. Because the retina undergoes almost
no natural changes during the course of a person's life, this technique is
regarded as extremely accurate. Nonetheless, inaccuracies may be caused
by changes in the blood vessel structures resulting from trauma or disease.
Iris recognition59 refers to the process of scanning the structure of the iris
using a video camera. This system too is highly reliable, as the structure of
the iris remains the same over time. Fingerprinting60 requires a person to
place his fingers over an optical scanner. This system is highly reliable,
although inaccuracies may be caused by dirt left on the scanner from previ-
ous use or by changes to the structure of the fingers (caused by scratches
or cuts that have left scars or prolonged manual labour) or by reason of
deliberate trickery (spreading clear adhesives that distort the structure of
52. C.S. Fishman, Electronic Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment: Knotts,
Karo and the Questions Still Unanswered, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 277, 281-82 (1985).
53. Froomkin, supra note 49, at 1479-80; M.M. Werdegar, Lost? The Government
Knows Where You Are: Cellular Telephone Call Location Technology and the Expectation of
Privacy, 10 STA. L. & POL'Y REV. 103, 105-06 (1998).
54. J.D. Woodward, Biometric Scanning, Law and Policy: Identifying the Concerns-
Drafting the Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. Pir. L. REV. 97, 101 (1997).
55. Id. at 99-101.
56. R.S. Peterson, DNA Databases: When Fear Goes Too Far, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1219, 1222-23 (2000).
57. The accuracy and reliability of a biometric device is determined according to two
parameters. First, the proportion of false identifications (the number of cases in which a
person whose details have not been scanned into the system is identified as a person
whose details have been scanned). Second, the proportion of false rejections (the num-
ber of cases in which a person whose details have been scanned into the system in the
past is not identified by it). See Woodward, supra note 54, at 101.
58. Id. at 102-03.
59. Id. at 103-04.
60. Id. at 104-05.
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the fingers). Hand geometry6 ' requires scanning of the length, width, and
height of the hand using an optical scanner. This technique has a low level
of reliability, as over the years, the palm of the hand undergoes many
changes-whether from aging, injuries, or carrying heavy loads. Face rec-
ognition6 2 requires photographs to be taken of a person's face, following
which a computer program measures angles and distances between geo-
metrical points on the face. This technique too possesses only a low level
of reliability because it finds it difficult to distinguish between people pos-
sessing similar facial structures and is easily influenced by alteration of the
angle of photography or modifications to the person's external appearance
(such as growing or removing a beard). Voice recognition6 3 requires the
recording and measurement of the frequency and pitch of a person's voice.
This technique possesses a low degree of reliability as a person's voice
alters with age, during illness, in times of strong emotion, or as a result of
background noise. In signature recognition,64 a computerized system
records the manner in which a person shapes letters, the speed of writing,
the pressure placed on the page, and the number of times that the writer
has raised his hand from the page. Injury or deliberate arbitrary move-
ments easily change the manner of writing, making this technique highly
inaccurate.
The range of techniques described above follow an identical process. 65
First, each system scans the characteristic on which it focuses. During the
second stage, the data is converted into a digital code. Subsequently, the
code is entered into a computerized data bank that contains other codes
entered in the past. Finally, the system engages in identification or verifica-
tion of identity. The first function involves scanning the details of a person
whose identity is unknown and then comparing the data to all the codes
contained in the data bank in the hope of finding a match. The second
function involves scanning the details of a person claiming a particular
identity and thereafter comparing those particular details to the code of the
person whose identity has been claimed, in an effort to find a match and
thereby verify his claim. The characteristics on which the biometric tech-
niques focus have the potential to reveal information concerning the health
of the person. Thus, for example, the human genome reveals information
concerning a predisposition to contract a particular disease; the structure
of the iris and the retina point to the possible existence of diseases such as
diabetes, high blood pressure, and AIDS, and certain studies claim that the
61. Id. at 105-06.
62. D. McCormack, Note, Can Corporate America Secure Our Nation? An Analysis of
the Identix Framework for the Regulation and Use of Facial Recognition Technology, 9 B.U.
J. Sci. & TECH. L. 128, 131 (2003); feature on FACE RECOGNITION, Publication of the
American Civil Liberties Union, at http://www.aclu.org/privacy/privacy.cfm?ID=12119
&c=130 (last visited July 27, 2003).
63. R. Moo-Young, Eyeing the Future: Surviving the Criticisms of Biometric Authentica-
tion, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 421, 435 (2001).
64. Id. at 435-36.
65. L.J. McGuire, Banking on Biometrics: Your Bank's New High-Tech Method of Identi-
fication May Mean Giving Up Your Privacy, 33 AKRON L. REV. 441, 445 (2000).
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geometrical structure of the hand points to the sexual orientation of a per-
son and his predisposition to chromosomal disorders. Accordingly, the
important question arises whether, after the biometric characteristic has
been converted into a digital code, obstacles should be placed on examin-
ing this information or whether the system should still allow it to be
analyzed.
66
The biometric systems are of great importance in the fight against ter-
rorism, as these can be positioned at the entrances to security sites or at
sites containing dangerous materials, such as fuel and gas depots, to pre-
vent terrorists from infiltrating and carrying out mega attacks. Likewise,
they can be positioned in public places to locate known terrorists whose
details have already been scanned into the system. They may be enhanced
by integrating them in systems belonging to other categories. Thus, for
example, a voice recognition system integrated with a system for inter-
cepting telephone calls would significantly increase the likelihood of inter-
cepting conversations between terrorists. Similarly, a face recognition
system combined with a closed circuit television data bank would make it
easier to locate wanted persons.
6 7
5. Technologies for Integrating Information
Information collected using the measures described above, like infor-
mation gathered from other sources, may be recorded and stored in com-
puterized data banks. Uniting these data banks into a super data bank
enables the compilation of a detailed portrait of the habits and lifestyle of
the subject. 68 Thus, for example, uniting data banks managed by govern-
mental authorities (such as registries of criminal records, family status,
education, and health) with data banks managed by private business enter-
prises (such as financial registries, telephone records, public library lend-
ing records, and records of searches and purchases at public online
auctions), would create a central data bank that would allow the identifica-
tion of persons whose actions or lifestyles are characteristic of terrorists or
supporters of terrorist organizations. 6 9
6. Terrorism profiling
Because good management of popular public places precludes the
stringent application of the measures described above to all those entering
66. Froomkin, supra note 49, at 1495; Woodward, supra note 54, at 115-16; Peter-
son, supra note 56, at 1223.
67. Sloan, supra note 39, at 1481; C.S. Milligan, Facial Recognition Technology, Video
Surveillance and Privacy, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 295, 306 (1999).
68. J. STANLEY & B. STEINHARDT, BIGGER MONSTER, WEAKER CHAINS: THE GROWTH OF
AN AMERICAN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 3-4, Publication of the American Civil Liberties
Union, at http://www.aclu.org/privacy/privacy.cfm?id=11573&c=39 (last visited June
2, 2003).
69. The best known initiative to establish a super data bank was that taken by the
US Department of Defense to create the TIA (Total Information Awareness). Certain
repugnance for this name caused it to be changed to Terrorism Information Awareness.
See http://www.darpa.mil/body/tia/TIA%20ES.pdf (last visited July 27, 2003).
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the premises, and because taking security measures entails significant
costs, it has become increasingly necessary to shift from zeroing in upon
individual terrorist suspects to locating suspect groups, the members of
which are subject to much more stringent scrutiny than the rest of the
public.
Terrorist profiling operates in a three-stage process. 70 In the first
stage, the intelligence services collect the maximum amount of data about
known terrorists (their country of birth, gender, age, family status, socio-
economic status, religious affiliation, religious commitment, education,
lifestyle, etc.). Next, a statistical analysis is carried out by determining the
frequency of each of the data and establishing the most frequent character-
istics as the criteria for the profile of the potential terrorist. People fitting
these criteria are regarded as being more likely to be terrorists than people
who do not fit the criteria. In the second stage, methods are established for
identifying the people who fit the profile. While most of the details regard-
ing the process of identification are secret, it may be said that they are
based both on a subjective test that examines the behavior of the person in
the relevant situation (nervousness, sweating, impatience, dishevelment, or
excessive neatness, etc.) and on an objective test that examines factors that
are independent of behavior (such as gender, age, nationality, religion, skin
color). In the third stage, those found to comply with the profile are sub-
jected to prolonged and stringent investigative processes, which include
interrogations and searches of their persons and property.
Profiling is used in four situations. The most well-known and com-
mon situation is the profiling of passengers at sea ports and in airports
(passenger profiling). In 1931, the first plane hijacking took place, when
Peruvian revolutionaries took control of an airplane to distribute propa-
ganda leaflets to residents of the country. In 1949, the first terrorist
caused a commercial aircraft to crash, when a woman hired two released
convicts to hide a bomb in a Philippines Airlines aircraft in which her hus-
band was to fly. Six years later, the United States suffered the same experi-
ence when a passenger boarded a plane without knowing that his luggage
contained a bomb planted by his son, who had plotted to kill him to obtain
payment from his father's life insurance. 7 1
These events showed the world the enormity of the catastrophe that
could occur in sea and air transport, and indeed they formed only the first
three links in a lengthening chain of terrorist and hijacking activities that
continue to this day. The efforts by a number of countries to eradicate this
phenomenon led to the invention of a variety of safety measures, which
included, inter alia, variations on the profiling system. Thus, for example,
the American airline companies feed the profile criteria into a computer-
ized system known as CAPPS (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening
System), which picks out passengers possessing suspect characteristics
70. D. Smith, Passenger Profiling: A Greater Terror than Terrorism Itself, 32 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 167, 168-72 (1998).
71. J.H. Daniel, Reform in Airport Security: Panic or Precaution?, 53 MERCER L. REV.
1623, 1624-25 (2002).
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from data banks operated by the airline companies containing the personal
details and destinations of their customers. Passengers fitting the profile,
together with a random sample of incompatible persons, are required to
undergo stringent and prolonged interrogative and examination proce-
dures. The possibility of upgrading the system by adding a large number of
private data banks (such as records of credit card purchases and purchases
at online public auctions) and public data banks (such as criminal records
and data banks operated by the intelligence services) is currently being
discussed.
7 2
A small group of people, who are more strongly suspected of involve-
ment in terrorist activities, is exempt from the profiling system described
above because their names in any event appear on the "No-Fly List" oper-
ated by the FBI. These people require particularly lengthy and rigorous
investigation, at the end of which they are not always allowed to fly.
73
In relation to Israeli airline companies, during the baggage check-in,
prior to receiving a boarding card, every passenger is asked a short series
of questions (such as to whom the suitcases belong, who packed them,
when and where the packing took place, where the suitcases were kept
between the completion of packing and arrival at the check-in, and
whether the passenger had been asked to carry anything for anyone).
These questions are designed to give the security staff time to determine
whether the passenger fits the profile criteria, based on the subjective
parameters described above as well as objective parameters, such as the
method of payment (cash or credit), whether the passenger has arrived
alone or is accompanied by another, places of departure and destination,
whether the air ticket is a single or return, whether the ticket was pur-
chased in advance or proximate to the time of departure, whether the pas-
senger plans to hire a vehicle in the country of destination, etc.7 4 As in the
United States, a defined group of passengers is exempt from this process
because the names of these passengers appear on the border control list
operated by the General Security Service, subjecting them to much more
rigorous security processes.
75
The second situation in which profiling is used is upon entry into
public places (the checks conducted of persons entering places such as
restaurants and bus stations, for example). These are much less thorough
than those conducted in the ports and are chiefly based on subjective
behavioral characteristics and objective data such as external appearance,
sometimes aided by information drawn from various data banks.
72. E. Baker, Flying While Arab-Racial Profiling and Air Travel Security, 67 J. AIR L. &
COM. 1375, 1379 (2002); DATA PROTECTION SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001: WHAT STRATEGY
FOR EUROPE?, Publication of Electronic Privacy Information Center, at http://www.epic.
org/privacy/intl/ep-statement 032503.pdf (last visited 3 August, 2003).
73. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Government Agency Releases
Documents on NO FLY, List, at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID =
13193&c=206 (last visited Aug. 3, 2003).
74. L. Braber, Korematsu's Ghost: A Post September 11th Analysis of Race and National
Security, 47 VILL. L. REv. 451, 460-61 (2002).
75. H.C. 4950/90 Tikvah Franz et al. v. Minister of Defense et al., 47(3) P.D. 36.
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The third situation concerns profiling of passersby (such as respond-
ing to security alerts about the infiltration of terrorists or as part of routine
security measures); the security forces place road barriers and patrol city
streets with the object of delaying, questioning, and sometimes even
searching the persons, vehicles, and property of people fitting the profile
criteria, where the identification procedure is based on identifying suspect
behavior, external appearance, possession of a vehicle suspected of being
stolen, or carrying non-Israeli license plates and the like.
The fourth situation in which the profile is used has an investigative
purpose as well as a preventive purpose in that it relates to profiling subse-
quent to a terrorist attack. Following every terrorist incident the security
forces not only question witnesses but also detain for interrogation or
arrest persons found at the site of the attack (including, on occasion, peo-
ple who themselves have been injured) or people seen in the vicinity
shortly after the attack, if they conform to the profile of persons suspected
of involvement in the incident. 76
As noted in the previous section, not all the circumstances falling
within the right to privacy are uniform in nature. Accordingly, we must
consider the degree of harm that each of the measures described above
causes to the right, based on the standards described in the last section.
Violation of the core right to privacy occurs when body searches are con-
ducted, when the suspect is x-rayed and his biometric fingerprints are
taken, thereby revealing his medical information. Violation of the interme-
diate level of the right occurs when events occurring at the home of the
suspect are recorded, searches are conducted of his premises or property,
his friends are questioned, his conversations monitored, his movements in
private places are tracked, and a range of biometric fingerprints, which do
not reveal medical information, are taken from his person. A violation at
the fringes of the right occurs when a person's acts and movements in public
places are tracked and recorded. Data banks can contain information
belonging to each facet of the right, and therefore it is the content of the
information located in each data bank that dictates the gravity of the
violation.
If, in the past, George Orwell's ominous prophesy concerning "Big
Brother" tracking and recording every facet of the lives of the populace was
regarded as unrealistic because of the technological impossibility of actual-
izing that goal, the above remarks show that today we live in a society in
which there is no such impediment. The issue of the restrictions that a
state in fact sets for itself and those that it should properly set for itself-
when required to safeguard state security yet continue to preserve the pri-
vacy of its citizens-is the subject of the next section.
76. T. Rotem, First the Shock of the Explosion, Afterwards the Fear that They Will Think
that I Am a Terrorist, HA'ARETZ, Sept. 29, 2002.
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II. The Legal Situation in Israel
In 1966, Israel signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which provides in Article 17 as follows:
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his
honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to protection of the law against such interference
or attacks.
77
In Israeli domestic law, recognition of the right to privacy was initially
implied from a line of statutory provisions that qualified the right to search
the person and premises of the individual, enter his property, disseminate
information about him, etc. However, over the years, as the methods of
invading a person's private life grew in quantity and sophistication, the
force of the traditional protections eroded and statutes were enacted that
entrenched various aspects of the right to privacy, such as protection
against monitoring and human and electronic surveillance. 78
When Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom was adopted in 1992,
its contribution to the protection of privacy was twofold. First, privacy was
recognized as an integral part of the human right to dignity, and therefore
it was granted the status of a constitutional basic right, which every govern-
mental authority must respect. 7 9 Second, for the first time, a statute
entrenched a general right to privacy-not one confined to the specific
issues that up to then had been established by statute. 80 At the same time,
because the concept of privacy was incapable of exhaustive definition, the
courts found it difficult to clearly delineate the boundaries of the right and
satisfied themselves with a general statement of principle:
77. The Covenant was signed by Israel on December 19, 1966, ratified on August 18,
1991, and entered into force on January 3, 1992. See International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. A similar provision is found in Article 12 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to the following effect: "No one shall be sub-
jected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the
law against such interference or attacks." See Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(1948), at http://www.hrweb.org/legal/udhr.html (last visited August 3, 2003). For the
legally binding nature of the Declaration, see 1. Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 572 (Clarendon Press, 3d ed. 1979).
78. Protection of Privacy Bill - 5741-1980, Hatzaot Chok 1453 at 206; R. Gavison,
The Right to Privacy, in HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL 303, 308 (T. Ben-Gal et al. eds.,
vol. C 1992).
79. Section 11 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, 1992, S.H., 150; A.
Barak, Interpretation in Law 421 (vol. 3: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, 1994).
80. Section 7 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom provides as follows:
(a) All persons have the right to privacy and to intimacy.
(b) There shall be no entry into the private premises of a person who has not
consented thereto.
(c) No search shall be conducted on the private premises of a person, nor in his
body or personal effects.
(d) There shall be no violation of the confidentiality of conversation, or of the
writings or records of a person.
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Now, as it has been given an enacted constitutional. basis, it must be inter-
preted from a "wide perspective".., and out of an understanding that we are
concerned with a provision which establishes a way of life. We are con-
cerned with human experience which must conform itself to a changing
reality .. accordingly a constitutional provision must be interpreted from a
broad perspective and not in a technical manner .. applying a substantive
approach and not a legalistic approach ... applying a pertinent approach
and not a technical or pedantic approach ... the right to privacy draws the
line between the individual and the public, between the "self' and society. It
delineates a zone in which the individual is left to himself, to develop his
"self," without the involvement of others.81
it follows that despite the general difficulty in determining the precise
scope of application of the right, it clearly contemplates protection of the
individual against the use of measures of the type described in the preced-
ing section.
It has been recognized that even in places where the human right to
privacy does apply, the legal protection of that right is not absolute, and
there will be cases where the right will be superseded by more important
interests, including the public interest in national security:
Doubtless, when we come to interpret statutory provisions we shall take into
account the fact that the right to privacy is an important right, but we are
not exempt from an examination of all the relevant factors and values, only
the weighing of which, within the framework of the statutory provision, can
lead us to the requisite outcome under the law.
8 2
The relativism of the right to privacy, like the relativism of all human
rights, ensues from the individual's obligation to sacrifice his rights for the
benefit of the community in which he lives, to the extent necessary to
ensure its continued existence, since that existence is a prerequisite to his
ability to actualize his rights.8 3 Sacrificing these rights is only constitu-
tional if it is carried out by virtue of a valid law that is compatible with the
values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, it has a proper
purpose, and where the extent of the violation of the right does not exceed
what is necessary.
8 4
There is no doubt that a violation of privacy aimed at preventing a
terrorist attack on innocent people has a worthy purpose that accords with
the values of Judaism and democracy, both of which recognize the neces-
sity of reducing standards of protection of individual rights in times of
crises and emergency, as opposed to times of peace and tranquility, to
enable the state to provide effective protection against threats to it.8 5 Con-
sequently, the primary problem centers on the extent to which these stan-
81. H.C. 2481/93 Dayan v. Superintendent of the Jerusalem District, 48(2) P.D. 456,
per Barak, supra note 79, at 470 (Heb.).
82. H.C. 3815/90 Gilat v. Minister of Police, 45(3) P.D. 414, 423 (Heb.).
83. Z. Segal, The Right to Privacy Versus the Right to "Know," 9(1) IUNE1 MISHPAT 175,
176 (1983) (Heb.).
84. Section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, supra note 79.
85. H.C. 680/88 Schnitzer v. The Chief Military Censor, 42(4) P.D. 617, 630 (Heb).
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dards must be reduced, i.e., finding the line that separates constitutional
violations of privacy from violations that exceed what is necessary.
The case law has held that finding this line entails a threefold test.
86
(A) The compatibility test-the infringing measure must lead rationally to
the achievement of the purpose of the infringement. (B) The least harm
test-among all the measures suitable for achieving the purpose, the
selected measure must be the one that causes the least harm to the right.
(C) The proportionality test-there must be a reasonable relationship
between the benefit accruing from realizing the purpose and the damage
caused to the individual as a result of the violation of his constitutional
right.
When we seek to determine whether violations of privacy satisfy these
conditions, we must take into account the basic premises underpinning
democratic society: on one hand, the war against terrorism does not justify
abandoning basic values in every case where a privacy violation would
assist the state. Even in its most difficult times, society must adhere to the
values for which it is fighting. On the other hand, notwithstanding that
human rights require democracy to struggle with one hand tied afore,
those rights are not a springboard for national ruin.8 7 Accordingly,
national security will enable proportional violation of human rights for the
sake of those human rights and to ensure their continued preservation.
We are referring here to a vertical constitutional balance that accords prior-
ity to the public interest in security over human rights, upon satisfying a
probability test that case law has not yet definitively determined.88 There
are those who believe that only a near certainty of real harm to national
security justifies a violation of human rights, while others are satisfied
with the reasonable likelihood test.89 In view of the special unremitting
character of the struggle faced by Israel, I agree with the following com-
ments of Professor Aharon Barak, the President of the Israeli Supreme
Court:
These formulations are good when there are special concrete and specific
dangers, within the context of defined events. It is not possible to turn to
them when we are concerned with social phenomena which form part of a
continuous process. In this matter broad margins of security must be main-
tained, as it is not possible to take unnecessary risks ... at the same time...
we must not accept a probability test which is satisfied solely with a distant
risk. It seems to me that the proper balance will be found in the reasonable
likelihood test.
90
86. Barak, supra note 79, at 536.
87. A. Barak, Comments at the Opening of the Legal Year 2002, 16 LAW AND ARMY 1,
2-5 (2002) (Heb.).
88. H.C. 2481/93 Dayan v. Superintendent of the Jerusalem District, 48(2) P.D. 456,
475.
89. Election Appeals [E.A.] 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of the Central Elections Com-
mittee of the Elections to the Eleventh Knesset, 39(2) P.D. 225, 311 (Heb.).
90. Id.
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Based on the foregoing, I shall now turn to an examination of the
scope of the protection accorded by Israeli law to the right to privacy, in
cases where it clashes with the national security interest.
A. Security Searches
Israeli law permits searches to be conducted of the premises of a per-
son, as well as of his body and his personal effects, for a variety of pur-
poses. The general arrangement regarding the power to search premises
provides that a police officer is entitled to conduct a search in a house or
place without a warrant if the following apply:
1. He has reason to believe that a felony is being committed, or has
recently been committed therein;
2. The occupier thereof calls in the assistance of the police;
3. Any person therein' calls in the assistance of the police, and there is
reason to believe that an offence is being committed therein;
4. He is pursuing a person evading arrest or escaping from lawful
custody. 9 1
In every other case, a search may only be conducted with a warrant,
which a judge has discretion to grant in the event of one of the following:
1. A search of the house or place is necessary to secure the production of
any article for the purpose of any investigation, trial or other proceeding;
2. The judge has reason to believe that the house or place is used for the
deposit or sale of a stolen article, or that there is kept or deposited therein
any article by means of or in respect of which an offence has been commit-
ted or which has been used, or is intended to be used for any illegal purpose;
or
3. The judge has reason to believe that a crime has been committed or it is
intended to commit an offence against a man present therein.
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Regarding body searches, even though these violate the individual's
core right to privacy, the searches themselves are distinct in terms of their
degree of gravity: a search of the stomach contents of a person is distinct
from a search of his clothes. Accordingly, the law distinguishes between
three types of searches: 93 the most invasive type, defined as an "internal
search," is carried out by blood tests, imaging of the interior of the body
using supersonic devices, x-rays, ultrasounds, or gynecological examina-
tions. The intermediate test, defined as an "external search," is carried out
91. Section 25 of the Criminal Procedure (Arrest and Searches) Ordinance (New
Version) 5729-1969, N.V. 12, 1969 284 (hereinafter the Criminal Procedure
Ordinance).
92. Section 23 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, supra note 91.
93. Section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, supra note 91; Section 1 of the
Criminal Procedure (Powers of Enforcement-Searches of the Body of the Suspect) Law
5756-1996, S.H. 1573 136 (hereinafter the Criminal Procedure Law). It is important to
note that, subject to a number of exceptions, a search may only be conducted by some-
one of the same gender as the suspect. See Section 46 of the Criminal Procedure Law;
Section 2 of the Criminal Procedure Law; Criminal Applications [Cr. Applic.] 2145/92
State of Israel v. Guetta, 56(5) P.D. 704, 713-14 (Heb.).
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by a frontal examination of the naked body of a person; fingerprinting all
aspects of the body; removing material from under the suspect's finger-
nails; cutting his fingernails; removing material from his nostrils; taking
hair samples including root samples; removing material from the surface of
the body; skin tests, urine, saliva and air samples; and buccal (cheek) cell
samples. The least invasive test, defined as a "search over the body of a
person," includes those searches that are neither internal nor external and
includes the power to search the clothes and personal effects 9 4 of the
individual.
A police officer is empowered to search the surface of the body of a
person being arrested. He may conduct an external search if he has rea-
sonable cause to suspect 9 5 that the suspect's body contains proof of the
commission of a felony or misdemeanor or proof of a connection between
the suspect and the commission of an offense. If the suspect objects to the
search, it may only be conducted with the authorization of a police com-
mander, who is only entitled to authorize a frontal examination of the sus-
pect's body, an examination of the skin, the fingerprinting of certain
aspects of the body, removal of material from under the fingernails, and
the taking of hair samples and materials from the surface of the body.
Internal searches in the body of a suspect may only be authorized by a
police commander who has reasonable cause to suspect that the suspect's
body contains proof of the commission of a felony (or in the case of a
blood test, a misdemeanor) or proof of a connection between the suspect
and the commission of an offense as aforesaid. The search may only be
conducted after a medical opinion has been given to the effect that there is
no medical obstacle to conducting the search and upon obtaining the sus-
pect's consent to the search. If the suspect refuses to consent, a court war-
rant must be obtained for the search. Any search may be conducted in the
body of a person, even if he is not suspected of involvement in an offense, if
he provides his consent thereto.
This arrangement provides the police-but not other enforcement
agencies-with tools for preempting or investigating crimes generally,
although clearly it cannot provide a sufficient answer to the threats posed
by terrorism. Consequently, a number of statutory provisions possessing
security objectives have expanded and increased the flexibility of the pow-
ers they confer. First, in relation to the power to search premises, Regula-
94. The term "effects" means the personal effect then being carried by the individ-
ual. See Criminal Appeals [Cr. App.] 663/81 Hori v. State of Israel, 36(2) P.D. 85, 90
(Heb.).
95. To establish reasonable cause for suspicion, it is not necessary to collect conclu-
sive evidence that leads to the certain conclusion that the person is involved in the
offense. On the other hand, it is not sufficient for the searcher to subjectively believe
that there is such involvement without supporting evidence. Reasonable suspicion
arises when, after considering all the circumstances (both those which tie and those
which free a person from suspicion), a reasonable person would suspect such involve-
ment. See H.C. 465/75 Dagni v. Minister of Police, 30(1) P.D. 337 (Heb.).
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tion 75 of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations 96 (hereinafter the
Regulations) empowers any soldier or police officer.to conduct a search in
any place-including in vehicles, aircraft, and sea vessels-if he has reason-
able cause to suspect that it is being used or will soon be used for a pur-
pose that harms public order or national security or that a person who has
committed one of the offenses listed in the Regulations is present therein.
The General Security Service Law9 7 (the "GSS Law") grants GSS oper-
atives the right to search the vehicle of a person who crosses Israel's border
points, if this is necessary to foil unlawful acts intended to harm national
security; to safeguard people, information or places decided upon by the
government; to otherwise safeguard or promote national interests essential
to the national security of the state. If the GSS operative has reasonable
cause to believe that the vehicle contains an item whose seizure is essential
to carrying out the operations of the GSS, he is entitled to conduct a search
therein even without the presence or knowledge of its owner. Likewise, the
law provides that the Prime Minister is entitled to provide written authori-
zation to GSS operatives to search vehicles or premises in the absence and
without the knowledge of the occupiers thereof (a "covert search"), if he is
persuaded that they contain information vital to carrying out the above-
mentioned operations of the GSS and that there is no other reasonable
method of achieving the purposes of the search. In cases where the search
cannot be delayed, the head of the GSS is empowered to authorize the
search, but he must notify the Prime Minister thereof within 72 hours of
granting such authorization.
The Civil Aviation Law 98 confers discretion upon a security officer, a
police officer, a soldier, or a member of the Civil Defense Force ("author-
ized examiners") to search the vehicle of a person entering the aerodrome
or present therein, if the search is necessary in his opinion to ensure public
safety.
The Powers of Search (Emergency) Law 99 provides that when a state of
emergency exists in the state by virtue of a declaration made under Basic
Law: the Government, the authorized examiners may carry out a search of
the vehicle of a person upon the entry of that person into any building or
enclosed premises, or while present in a sea port, if in their opinion such a
search is necessary to protect public security. Likewise, the law enables
authorized examiners to carry out a search of vessels upon their entry into
a seaport or while present there, if in their opinion such a search is neces-
sary to protect public security. Additionally, power is granted to search
vehicles or vessels irrespective of where located, where it is suspected that
96. Defense (Emergency) Regulations 1945, Official Gazette supp. 2 855 (hereinaf-
ter the Defense Regulations).
97. Sections 9 and 10 of the General Security Service Law 5762-2002, S.H. 1832,
179 (hereinafter the GSS Law).
98. Section 9 of the Air Navigation (Safety of Civil Aviation) Law, 5757-1977, S.H.
854, 126 (hereinafter the Civil Aviation Law).
99. Section 3 of the Powers of Search (Emergency) (Temporary Provision) Law,
5729-1969, S.H. 571, 226.
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there are arms or explosives unlawfully present in such vehicles or vessels
as the case may be.
Second, in relation to the power to search the body of suspects, Regu-
lation 76 of the Emergency Regulations vests every soldier or police officer
with the power to carry out a search of the body of a person if he has
reasonable cause to believe that the person is carrying an article that he
used to commit an offense listed in the Regulations, that an offense was
committed in relation to it, or that it may be used as evidence of the com-
mission of an offense as aforesaid.
Section 9 of the Civil Aviation Law empowers the authorized examin-
ers to search the body of any person entering or present in any aerodrome
or aircraft if in their opinion the search is necessary to protect the security
of the public. Where a person refuses to allow his body to be searched, the
law categorically prohibits him from being transported and also vests dis-
cretion to carry out the search despite the person's refusal, to prevent the
person from entering or leaving the aerodrome, or to remove him from the
aerodrome.
Section 3 of the Powers of Search (Emergency) (Temporary Provision)
Law empowers the authorized examiners to search the body of a person
upon entering a building or enclosed premises or while present in a sea
port, if in their opinion such a search is necessary to protect public secur-
ity. Likewise, the law enables authorized examiners to carry out a search
of a person's body-irrespective of where he is located-where it is sus-
pected that he is unlawfully carrying arms or explosives.
The Law Regulating Security in Public Bodies' 0 0 requires the bodies
listed therein, such as government offices and defense establishment facili-
ties, to appoint a security officer to be responsible for the organization and
implementation of its security activities, and it vests that security officer
and the guards subordinate to him with the powers of search established
by the Powers of Search (Emergency) (Temporary Provision) Law. 1 1 Sec-
tion 9 of the GSS Law grants GSS operatives the power to search the body
of a person and his personal effects and goods if this is necessary to carry
out one of the activities referred to above in relation to the power to search
premises (i.e., to foil an unlawful act, to guard public figures, places and
information, and to promote interests essential to national security). In the
event that the GSS operative has reasonable cause to believe that the effects
of a person contain an item whose seizure is essential to carry out the
aforesaid activities, he is entitled to search them even in the absence and
without the knowledge of their owner.
The above review reveals that the powers of search-both in the prem-
ises and on the body of a person-are extremely broad and comprehensive.
In the name of state security it is possible to search not only the premises
and vehicles of a person suspected of terrorist involvement, but also the
100. Sections 2, 3 and 13 of the Law Regulating Security in Public Bodies,
5758-1998, S.H. 1685, 348.
101. The same also applies to the power to search premises.
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premises and vehicles of a person who is not a suspect, sometimes in his
absence and without his knowledge. Likewise, it is possible to search the
body of a person, even when he is not suspected of involvement in hostile
activities.
This brings us, therefore, to the principal question: Is this an appropri-
ate arrangement?
To answer this question we examine two subordinate issues to clarify
the precise scope of the above arrangement. First, we shall examine the
nature of the technological measures that, when used, comprise a search
and focus on the precise significance of the various search powers. Next,
we shall examine the criteria used in applying the various search powers.
After answering these two questions, we shall be able to draw a conclusion
regarding the constitutionality of the search arrangements in Israeli law.
1. The Technological Measures Which When Used May Be Regarded as
Performing a Search
a. Searching in a person. Until the enactment of the Criminal Proce-
dure Law, searches were regulated by Section 22 of the Criminal Procedure
Ordinance, which established the power to search the person of the sus-
pect, his clothes, and his effects. The power to search the person of the
suspect was interpreted by the case law as limited solely to an external
search of the body (following the enactment of the Criminal Procedure
Law, this power was divided into a power to conduct an external search
and a power to conduct residual searches), in contrast to an internal search
of the body, which requires express consent.
10 2
Following the amendment of the law, most of the other statutory
security provisions were correspondingly amended to clarify that the
search powers vested by them are identical to those established by Section
22.103
Because the power to conduct an external search embraces a frontal
examination of the naked body of the suspect and an examination of the
surface of the skin-the two principal procedures required in the circum-
stances contemplated by Section 22-we may see that in practice it
deprives the power to search the surface of a person's body of almost any
meaning and leaves the main significance of the latter to searches of the
clothing and effects of the suspect.
10 4
102. Cr. App. 663/81 Hori v. State of Israel, 36(2) P.D. 85, 91-92 (Heb.).
103. The only provision that was not amended was that established in the Defense
(Emergency) Regulations. There are those who believe that since reference is to a special
search power that is established by defense legislation, it should be interpreted in accor-
dance with the meaning which was accorded to an external search prior to the law being
amended and not restricted to the residual power currently set out in Section 22. In my
opinion, this interpretation is not only incompatible with the other defense legislation
powers but also conflicts with the interpretation required by Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Freedom. See I. KEDMI, ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 392 (vol. A 1992) (Heb.).
104. For this reason there are those who believe that the power to conduct a frontal
examination and a skin test should be construed as applying only to activities con-
Cornell International Law Journal
To date, the case law has not determined which of the investigative
methods described above will be deemed to comprise a search, notwith-
standing the great importance of clarifying the conditions in which they
may be implemented. In view of the definitions assigned to the three cate-
gories of search, it is not inconceivable that when these issues are eventu-
ally examined, it will be possible to contend that the use of thermal
imagers to detect the heat waves emitted by the human body should be
regarded as an internal search since they image the interior of the person's
body. Likewise, scanning a person's body with radar skin scanners, pas-
sive millimeter wave imaging, and x-ray devices should arguably be classed
as frontal examinations and therefore external searches.10 5 Biometric mea-
sures entailing retina and iris identification, fingerprints,' 0 6 palm geome-
try, and facial and auditory identification should be regarded as taking
prints of body parts and therefore as themselves comprising an external
search. At the same time, judicial policy reasons may lead to the conclu-
sion that because a person's hand, fingers, features, and voice are bodily
characteristics that are generally visible, they should not be regarded as
comprising a frontal examination of the naked person, but rather as an
external search.
b. Searching premises: Apart from the physical aspects of the search
of a person's premises, the law provides that penetrating computer mate-
rial also comprises a search, that may only be carried out on the basis of a
judicial warrant issued on one of the grounds of search set out in Section
23. Penetrating computer material is defined as: "[p]enetration by means
of communicating or connecting with a computer, or by operating it, save
for penetration into computer material which comprises tapping under the
Secret Monitoring Law, 5739-1979."107 It follows that the law distin-
guishes between penetrating a particular computer, which comprises an
invasion of the privacy of the computer user and resembles entry into his
premises, and monitoring the means of communication between com-
puters. The former case is subject to the laws regulating the search of
premises while the latter case is regulated by the Secret Monitoring Law,
which shall be discussed below. ' 0 8
2. Manner of Implementing the Powers of Search- Profiling
Every day thousands of people pass through the doors of bus stations,
shopping centers, tourist sites, sea ports, and airports. Security considera-
ducted in relation to intimate parts of the body and that the power of search established
by Section 22 should apply to the remaining cases. See KEDMI, supra note 103, at 378.
105. As these devices image the entire body of a person, this is the law even in the
opinion of those who believe that only an examination of intimate parts of the body
comprises an external search.
106. This is subject to the limitation set out in Section 13 of the Criminal Procedure
Law, to the effect that the restrictions on external searches should not be applied to
fingerprints taken solely for identification purposes.
107. Section 4 of the Computers Law, 5755-1995, S.H. 1534, 366.
108. Computer Bill, 5754-1994, Hatzaot Hock 2278, 478.
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tions have led the law to permit searches of persons and their effects even
though they are not suspected of involvement in any unlawful activities
whatsoever. Powers of search in relation to persons who are suspected of
terrorist activities are even wider and, inter alia, authorize both internal
and external searches of their body. Likewise, security considerations
have led the law to permit searches of the vehicle and premises of a person,
even though he is not suspected of terrorist involvement.
This explains the importance of the standards that guide the applica-
tion of these powers.
The search laws are silent on this issue and security considerations
preclude the disclosure of the internal directives now in use. 10 9 In prac-
tice, reports issued by human rights organizations' 1 0 and the accounts of
journalists"1 show that the powers are operated on a profiling basis, so
that those who fit the profile criteria of the potential terrorist are conse-
quently suspected of involvement in terrorist activities and are therefore
subject to a prolonged and intensive process of questioning and searches of
their bodies, effects and premises, while those who do not conform to the
profile are exempt from examination in certain circumstances (for exam-
ple, where road blocks are set up) or are subject to merely perfunctory
109. H.C. 4950/90 Tikvah Franz et al. v. Minister of Defense et al., 47(3) P.D. 36, 43.
110. The press release issued by the Israeli Citizens Rights Association regarding the
attitude displayed by "Arkia" Airline security personnel to an Arab passenger is an
example:
Mr. Tlawi wished . . . to travel to Kiryat Shemona on a flight from Sdeh Dov
using the Arkia company. However, both during his flight from Sdeh Dov and
during his flight back from Kiryat Shemona, Mr. Tlawi was forced to undergo a
series of humiliating and insulting interrogations .... When the Arkia security
personnel in Sdeh Dov became aware that Mr. Tlawi is an Arab he was forced to
undergo a series of humiliating and insulting interrogations and checks,
whereas other passengers were questioned for a minute or two .... Mr. Tlawi
was questioned at length both during the flight from Sdeh Dov and during the
flight back; his interrogators made it explicit that this was because he is an Arab.
Likewise, see the press release issued by the Israeli Citizens Rights Association regarding
the attitude displayed by security personnel in the "Bat Galim" train station in Haifa to
an Arab passenger:
Mr. At'mana is the manager of a youth association which seeks to bring Jewish
and Arab youth closer to one another. He was delayed and questioned in an
insulting and humiliating manner simply because he is an Arab. There was no
reason justifying the different attitude taken to him compared to the other pas-
sengers, who at the most underwent a routine baggage check upon entering the
train station .... Mr. At'mana is not the only Arab citizen who receives different,
humiliating and insulting treatment from the security personnel in Israeli train
stations. Many Arab citizens of the State of Israel who travel in the trains are
forced to undergo an exhausting and insulting series of questions and checks-
which far exceed the routine security checks .... [T]he circumstances point to
the fact that as a whole the Arab citizens of the State of Israel are classified as
passengers who pose "a high level" of risk to national security and public safety,
as distinct from the other citizens of the state.
These examples are available at http://www.acri.org.il/hebrew-acri/engine/story.asp?
id=318; http://www.acri.org.il/hebrew-acri/engine/story.asp?id=237 (last visited July
31, 2003).
111. Rotem, supra note 76; A. Segev, Humiliation Carries a Price, HA'ARETZ, July 17,
2000.
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searches in other circumstances (for example, when passing through sea
and airports).
Implementing powers on the basis of profiling entails numerous legal
and moral dilemmas. On the moral level, there is an obvious difficulty in
determining how to treat an individual based on his affiliation to a particu-
lar group because, at least prima facie, perception of him as part of a col-
lective as opposed to as an independent entity worthy of separate
consideration, might undermine the most basic tenets of the liberal ideal
that forms one of the pillars of the democratic regime. On the legal level,
the constitutionality of the use of profiling is not free of doubt, albeit these
doubts have not been the subject of judicial attention.
The first doubt concerns the basic question whether as a matter of law
it is even possible to exercise the power to conduct a security search in this
manner. Administrative law provides that the power must be exercised
fairly, equally, reasonably, honestly, and in good faith. 1 12 The central
issue, therefore, is whether profiling is discriminatory and consequently
prohibited or, alternatively, whether it is a permitted inquiry.
The principle of equality is a fundamental tenet of Israeli law that has
its origin in the Declaration of Independence in which the State of Israel
undertook to guarantee the equality of all its citizens without distinction
between religion, race, and gender. The principle of equality is not
entrenched in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, but case law has
recognized its transformation into a constitutional supralegal right within
the framework of human dignity. 113 Equality means the neutral and uni-
form implementation of normative powers for all individuals save if there
is a relevant substantive difference between them, in which case differences
in implementation will not amount to unlawful discrimination but will
rather be regarded as a lawful distinction. 1 14
In my opinion, use of profiling, subject to the restrictions described
below, cannot be described as a form of prohibited discrimination. As
noted, a profile is composed of a collection of characteristics that are fre-
quently present in known terrorists. When the frequency of a particular
characteristic among terrorists (such as nationality, religion, gender, age,
family status, or socioeconomic condition) is clearly disproportional rela-
tive to its frequency in the rest of the population, it becomes a substantive
and weighty issue that justifies and even obligates the state to take extra
precautions against those who possess this characteristic, in view of the
huge importance of preventing acts of terror.
In the alternative, because equality, like privacy, is a relative value that
requires a balance to be drawn when it clashes with the public interest in
112. H.C. 297/82 Berger v. Minister of the Interior, 37(3) P.D. 29, 34 (Heb.).
113. H.C. 721/94 El Al Israel Airlines Ltd. v. Danielovitz, 48(5) P.D. 749, 759-60
(Heb.).
114. A. RUBINSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, 285 (5th ed.,
vol. A 1996) (Heb.).
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national security, 115 we may argue that even if profiling is discriminatory,
the principle of equality will retreat upon the existence of a reasonable
likelihood of harm to security.
The second doubt concerns the question whether every characteristic
may be used as a profiling criterion or whether those basic characteristics
in the democratic experience-race, nationality, and religion-ought to be
rejected as legitimate criteria.
Here, too, I believe that the test for regarding any characteristic as a
relevant and, therefore, legitimate factor is the test of incidence among ter-
rorists. Thus, in circumstances where all the terrorist attacks against the
Jewish population in Israel are carried out by Moslem Arabs, failure to take
into account the factors of nationality and religion would amount to an
irrational and contrived avoidance of reality.1 16 At the same time, one can-
not disregard the risk of sliding down the slippery slope inherent in depen-
dence on these characteristics,' 17 i.e., falling into the trap of creating a
stereotypical social climate that legitimizes the racist and degrading treat-
ment of groups in the population, the majority of the members of which
abhor the acts of killing no less than the members of groups that are not
suspect.
To negate this risk, my view is that profiles based solely on these char-
acteristics should not be permitted; rather, these factors should be inte-
grated into a broader range of characteristics, thereby guaranteeing that not
all those affiliated with the particular groups concerned will automatically
be subject to such serious violations of their privacy. 11 8
The third doubt concerns the efficiency of the profiling system. The
theory on which this system is based is that the statistical incidence of
particular characteristics possessed by known terrorists is relevant to the
identification of potential terrorists. 1 19 Skeptics argue that because every
person follows unique, sometimes strange, practices, it is not possible to
identify suspicious patterns of behavior based solely on statistical charac-
teristics. 120 Thus, for example, in the United States, profiling in the air
transport sector began at the end of the 1960s, in the aftermath of a wave
of airplane hijackings; however, it was stopped in 1972, when it was proved
to be ineffective. When profiling was brought back into use in 1998, this
time in the shape of the computerized CAPPS version, it only succeeded in
identifying two of the aircraft hijackers on September 11, 2001.121
While profiling has achieved some success, it has on occasion proved
defective both in terms of falsely identifying innocent persons and in fail-
ing to identify terrorists. At the same time, no alternative currently availa-
115. H.C. 246/81 Derech Eretz Assoc. v. Broadcasting Authority, 35(4) P.D. 1, 33
(Heb.).
116. Baker, supra note 72, at 1398.
117. SJ. Ellmann, Racial Profiling and Terrorism, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
305, 360 (2003).
118. Braber, supra note 74, at 474-75.
119. Baker, supra note 72, at 1378.
120. J. STANLEY & B. STEINHARDT, supra note 68, at 12.
121. Baker, supra note 72, at 1378, 1398.
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ble offers a better solution. Avoiding the use of profiling would entail
establishing uniform security arrangements for the entire population.
Inevitably, to allow people to pursue a normal way of life, the standard of
implementation would have to be lower than is currently applied to those
who meet the profile criteria. At the same time, the injury caused to the
privacy of the entire population would be uniform even though interpreta-
tion of the provisions of the search laws in the spirit of the Basic Laws
requires that the degree of injury to each individual be compatible with the
level of risk posed by each individual.
3. The Constitutionality of the Search Arrangements
The security search powers are scattered through a large number of laws,
meaning that drawing a comprehensive picture of the ability of the law
enforcement agencies to invade the property and person of individuals in
Israel is not an easy task.
We have seen that every person may be subjected to a routine external
search of the surface of his body. The search may be conducted by a police
officer, soldier, home command officer, or security officer, whereas per-
sons suspected of involvement in terrorism are subject to internal and
external searches of their body under the general search power accorded
by the Criminal Procedure Law, a power that has been conferred solely on
the Israel police force. Likewise, we have seen that use of profiling meth-
ods formulates suspicion. It follows that, whereas every person is subject
to routine search of the surface of his body, his clothing, and personal
effects, only terrorist suspects are subject to more extensive bodily
searches.
This principle, while proportional, entails a number of arrangements
that infringe the privacy of a person in an excessive manner. First, the
power to conduct a covert search of the premises and vehicle of a person is
not only confined to persons suspected of involvement in terrorist activi-
ties, but its exercise is also not subject to prior judicial review (by means of
applying to the court for a search warrant, in cases where the search may
be delayed) or even retrospective review (in cases where the search is
required immediately), and it is sufficient for the Prime Minister to give his
approval, or in urgent cases for the head of the GSS to give his approval.
12 2
Judicial review in these circumstances is particularly important;
whereas the general arrangements relating to the search of premises enable
witnesses to be present while the search is carried out to allow them to
supervise its performance and prevent overstepping of the search war-
rant,123 this right is negated when covert searches are performed. Moreo-
ver, the law does not determine whether and when a person whose
premises or vehicle is being searched is entitled to know of that search, and
consequently that person is deprived of the ability to challenge its validity.
122. Comments of the Israeli Citizens Rights Association regarding the GSS bill, at
http://www.acri.org.il/hebrew-acri/engine/story.asp?id=372 (last visited Aug. 3, 2003).
123. Section 26 of the Criminal Procedure Law; Misc. App. [Misc. App.] (Jerusalem)
1153/02 State of Israel v. Abergil (as yet unpublished), §§ 26-28 (Heb.).
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The power to conduct a covert search of the personal effects and vehi-
cle of a person who crosses a border checkpoint is even more far-reaching,
since it does not require authorization of the search, and service personnel
may exercise that power at their discretion.
There may indeed be security investigations that will be frustrated if
certain persons learn of searches prior to those searches being conducted
or while underway; however, it would seem that there can be no justifica-
tion for allowing such a severe violation of privacy-particularly in cases
where the person is not suspected of involvement in an offense-without
first applying to a court for a search warrant and thereby guaranteeing its
propriety. In cases where there is insufficient time for an application, the
search should only be permitted upon authorization by the Prime Minister
or the head of the GSS (and this would be appropriate even in relation to
covert searches at border checkpoints) subject to an obligation to apply to
court for a retroactive warrant affirming the legality of the search.
Likewise, the silence of the law relating to notification should not be
interpreted as a negative arrangement exempting the security authorities
from the principles of administrative law regarding fairness and reasona-
bleness. Under those principles, notification must be made within a rea-
sonable period of time from the moment the security grounds for secrecy
disappear, as it is evident that had the legislature wished to establish an
exception in relation to these basic principles, and thereby cause indirect
harm to the individual's right to be heard, this would have been done by
express legislative provision. 
124
Secondly, when the question of the constitutionality of the border
checkpoint lists was made the subject of judicial consideration, the court
held that the GSS had to enable those included in the list to challenge the
decision in court and, in the event that their application was rejected, to
allow them to file an administrative petition to the High Court of Justice
against the decision. The court left open the possibility of applying prior
judicial review, i.e., establishing a rule whereby a precondition for includ-
ing a person in the list is that an ex parte application has been made to the
court for authorization of this action. 12 5 The broad language of Section 98
of the GSS Law, which, as noted, permits service personnel to search the
body, cargo or vehicle of a person who crosses a border checkpoint, in
practice permits use of this list, but without establishing criteria for includ-
ing or excluding names from the list or, indeed, an alternative mechanism
for judicial review.
Because, by its nature, the list is determined in advance, there seems to
be no relevant obstacle to the imposition of prior judicial review, except in
cases where there are urgent security grounds for swiftly including the
name of a person in the list, in which case it is appropriate that the judicial
review be conducted retrospectively, as close in time as possible to the time
124. Likud party caucus in Petach Tikvah Municipality v. Council of Petach Tikvah
Municipality, 34(2) P.D. 566, 580-81 (Heb.).
125. H.C. 4950/90 Tikvah Franz et al. v. Minister of Defense et al., 47(3) P.D. 36,
43-44.
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of its inclusion.'
2 6
B. Secret Monitoring Within the Framework of Security Investigations
The Secret Monitoring Law 127 regulates the laws applicable to the use
of devices for listening in to the conversations of others, without the con-
sent of at least one of the speakers. 1 28 A "conversation," for the purposes
of this law, is defined broadly and includes conversation by word of mouth
or by a land line or cordless telephone, communication by way of fax, as
well as communications between computers.' 29 For our purposes, three
types of monitoring are relevant: first, monitoring the conversations of a
person within the public domain 130 may only take place upon authoriza-
tion by the head of a security authority 13 1 for reasons of national security.
Second, monitoring the conversations of a person in private may only be
conducted upon written permission given by the Prime Minister or by the
Minister of Defense, if they are satisfied that it is necessary to do so for
reasons of state security. In cases that require secret monitoring to be car-
ried out without delay and there is no time to obtain a permit, the head of a
security authority is empowered to permit such monitoring in writing but
must notify the Prime Minister or Minister of Defense of the same forth-
with, and the latter may cancel or modify the permit.
132
The relative ease with which secret monitoring may be carried out in
the public domain (compared to that carried out in private) requires that
these terms be explained. "Public domain" is defined in Section 8 as "a
place where a reasonable person could have expected that his conversa-
tions would be monitored without his consent." It follows that the "private
domain" is a place where a reasonable person would expect that his conver-
sations would not be monitored. Consequently, the law provides a sub-
stantive, objective test: when a person's subjective expectation of privacy
(disclosed by his conduct) is reasonable, i.e., is legitimate in the eyes of the
public, his conversations must be monitored in accordance with rules
applicable to monitoring in the private domain. An expectation of privacy
may be reasonable not only in a place where a person has a proprietary
interest (such as in his house or vehicle), but also in a public place. Thus,
for example, zwo persons secluding themselves in an isolated spot in a caf6
or a person talking in a public telephone box have legitimate expectations
126. Comments of the Israeli Citizens Rights Association regarding the GSS bill, supra
note 122.
127. The Secret Monitoring Law, 5739-1979, S.H. 938, 118.
128. Likewise, the law regulates the unusual situation in which a person "talks" to
himself.
129. Section 1 of the Secret Monitoring Law defines a conversation as being carried
out by "word of mouth or by telecommunications, including by telephone, cordless tele-
phone, mobile radio telephone, wireless communication device, facsimile, telex, tele-
printer or communications between computers."
130. Section 8 of the Secret Monitoring Law, supra note 127.
131. Section 1 of the law defines a security "authority" as follows: 1. the Intelligence
Branch of the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces; 2. the General Security Service.
132. Id. Sections 4 and 5.
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of privacy in the eyes of the public, and therefore their communications
should be monitored in accordance with the rules applicable to monitoring
in the private domain.
The third type refers to monitoring of conversations (in the public or
private domain), such as conversations between attorney and client or
between doctor and patient, testimony of which is privileged under the
Evidence Ordinance. 133 Such monitoring is permitted upon the existence
of three cumulative conditions. First, it must be essential for reasons of
national security for the purpose of investigating a felony. Second, there
must be reasonable cause to suspect that the professional, conversation
with whom is privileged, is involved in the offense. Third, upon meeting
the two preceding conditions, the President of the District Court has dis-
cretion to decide whether or not to grant permission for the monitoring. It
should be emphasized that only when this type of monitoring is involved
does the law require judicial scrutiny.
There is no dispute that secret monitoring offers great advantages in
the investigation of acts of terror, and the fact that the power to monitor is
limited solely to the Intelligence Branch of the IDF and to the GSS reduces
the potential for harm. At the same time, these facts do not justify the
absence of a requirement for judicial scrutiny prior to monitoring being
carried out, save in those cases where the urgency of the matter precludes
such scrutiny, in which event retroactive judicial scrutiny must suffice.
In addition, while the law requires that a permit to monitor in the
private domain include details of the person whose conversations are to be
monitored, the mode of monitoring, and the duration of validity of the per-
mit, there is no equivalent provision for monitoring in the public domain,
so that at least prima facie, it would seem that the permit may be general in
relation to time, mode, location, and the identity of the speakers and the
persons authorized to monitor them. 13 4 When this issue was brought
before the court, one opinion was that the existence of restrictions on mon-
itoring in the private domain implied a negative arrangement in relation to
the existence of restrictions in the public domain; others thought that rules
of proper administration also required the imposition of these rules to
monitoring within the public domain. 135
In my view, an additional defect may be found in the fact that while
there is a duty to report annually to the Knesset Committee regarding the
number of monitoring permits issued for the private domain, there is no
equivalent duty for monitoring in the public domain. This monitoring too
violates the privacy of the individual, albeit less severely than monitoring
133. Id. Sections 9 and 9A.
134. A. Stein, Secret Monitoring and Concealed Electronic Surveillance as Means for Pro-
moting Criminal and Security Investigations, 14 MISHPATIM 527, 544 (1985).
135. Criminal File [Cr. F.] (Tel-Aviv) State of Israel v. Falach, 1981 A District Ct. Judg-
ments 177 (Heb.); Cr. F. (Nazareth) 332/79 State of Israel v. Cohen and others, 1980 B
District Ct. Judgments 116 (Heb.); Cr. A. 598/80 Cohen and others v. State of Israel,
35(2) P.D. 393 (Heb.).
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in the private domain,n and accordingly it, too, should be subject to public
scrutiny in relation to the manner of its implementation.
C. Surveillance, Monitoring, and Photography
The Protection of Privacy Law establishes the rules applicable to about
11 aspects of the right to privacy,1 36 three of which are relevant for our
purposes: listening in to the conversations of a person without the assis-
tance of technological devices;1 37 photographing a person while he is in
the private domain, such as installing concealed cameras in the home and
vehicle of a person; and spying on, trailing, or other harassment. Clearly
the rules on spying on, trailing, or other harassment regulate covert human
surveillance of another person;138 however, one may ask which of the tech-
nological measures discussed in Part III also fall within its boundaries.
The case law has held that the terms "spying" or "trailing" "refer to external
surveillance of the movements of a person,"'13 9 while the term "other har-
assment" has been described as "a difficult and unclear expression" that
cannot be given a literal definition and accordingly must be interpreted in
the light of the statutory purpose that it is intended to achieve. 140 This
purpose, in the view of the majority of the judges, confines the scope of its
136. Protection of Privacy Law, 5741-1981, S.H. 1011, 128.
Section 2 of the law provides that infringement of privacy is any of the following:
(1) spying on or trailing a person in a manner likely to harass him, or any other
harassment;
(2) listening in prohibited under any law;
(3) photographing a person while he is in the private domain;
(4) publishing a person's photograph under such circumstances that the publication is
likely to humiliate him or bring him into contempt;
(5) copying or using, without permission from the addressee or writer, the contents of a
letter or any other writing not intended for publication, unless the writing is of historical
value or 15 years have passed since the time of writing;
(6) using a person's name, appellation, picture or voice for profit;
(7) infringing a duty of secrecy laid down by law in respect of a person's private affairs;
(8) infringing a duty of secrecy laid down by express or implicit agreement in respect of
a person's private affairs;
(9) using or passing on to another, information on a person's private affairs otherwise
than for the purpose for which it was given;
(10) publishing or passing on anything obtained by way of an infringement of privacy
under paragraphs (1) to (7) or (9); or
(11) publishing any matter relating to a person's intimate life, state of health or conduct
in the private domain.
Id.
137. In this connection it is worth noting that in the period between December 2001
and November 2002, Regulation 29(b) of the Prison Regulations, 5738-1978, provided
that a meeting between a prisoner and his attorney would take place out of the hearing
range of the prison guards, save if there was reasonable cause to suspect that a meeting
carried out in this manner would endanger national security. For further elaboration of
this issue, see the petition filed by the Association of Civil Rights on this matter, in
consequence of which the language of the Regulation was modified, H.C. 1437/02 Asso-
ciation of Civil Rights v. Minister of Internal Security and others, at http://www.acri.
prg.il/hebrew-acri/engine/story.asp?id=385 (last visited Aug. 3, 2003).
138. F.H. 9/83 Military Appeal Court v. Vaknin, 42(3) P.D. 837, 851 (Heb.).
139. H.C. 249/82 Vaknin v. Military Appeal Court, 37(2) P.D. 393, 426 (Heb.).
140. Id. at 427-28.
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application solely to acts infringing privacy other than by the use of physi-
cal force or violence. 14 1 Consequently, this category would appear to
include overt human surveillance, closed circuit camera surveillance in the
public domain, use (in public and private) of binoculars, telescope and
night vision glasses, and beepers, as well as metal detectors, thermal
imagers, passive millimeter wave imaging, radar skin scanners, x-ray cam-
eras and biometric equipment, to the extent that they do not fall within the
definition of an external search or a search of the surface of the body.
Whereas the rule is that an infringement of privacy is both a criminal
offense and a civil tort, Section 19(b) of the law provides that a security
authority1 4 2 or a person acting on its behalf "shall bear no responsibility
under this law for an infringement reasonably committed within the scope
of its or his functions and for the purpose of carrying them out." From this
provision, it follows, first, that an infringement of privacy for security rea-
sons may also be directed against a person who is not suspected of involve-
ment in terrorist activities. The question arises as to the position of an
infringement of privacy that requires entry into the premises of an individ-
ual to carry it out (for example, installing a surveillance camera in a per-
son's home or planting a beeper in his property). Section 17(b) of the
Interpretation Law 14 3 grants a person who has been affirmatively empow-
ered to do something the auxiliary powers reasonably required to perform
that function; however, the Protection of Privacy Law does not grant the
security authorities an affirmative power but merely an exemption 1 44
Accordingly, to carry out these powers it would seem necessary to obtain a
warrant permitting entry into the premises of the individual. Second, the
test of the reasonableness of the infringement, which is a precondition for a
discharge from liability, is amorphous and lacks any real meaning, and
indeed to date the courts have refrained from establishing standards for its
application. It seems to me that the reasonableness of the infringement of
privacy should be established in the light of all the circumstances of the
specific case, with special emphasis placed on the manner and severity of
the infringement.
As noted, the law is applicable to many of the devices for infringing
privacy described in Part III. At the same time, these devices differ from
each other, not only in the gravity of the infringement of privacy but also
in their level of efficiency. Thus, for example, we have considered the rela-
tive degrees of reliability of the range of biometric devices. Studies con-
ducted in the United States and Britain have raised doubts as to the
efficiency of closed circuit television cameras in preventing crime, includ-
ing acts of terrorism. The monotony involved in watching the television
141. F.H. 9/83 Military Appeal Court v. Vaknin, 42(3) P.D. 837, 851 (Heb.).
142. The definition of a security authority for the purpose of this law is broader than
that provided in the Secret Monitoring Law and includes the Israel Police, the Intelli-
gence Branch of the General Staff and the Military Police of the Israel Defense Forces,
the General Security Service, and the Intelligence and Special Duties Branch, see Section
19(c) of the Protection of Privacy Law, supra note 136.
143. The Interpretation Law, 5741-1981, S.H. 1030, 302.
144. Stein, supra note 134, at 555.
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screens leads to a decrease in concentration of the personnel manning the
control centers to below average levels after only twenty minutes of watch-
ing, and therefore the likelihood of identifying suspect movements is
extremely low. 1 4 5 Consequently, the greater the harm caused by a device
to the privacy of an individual, and the darker the shadow hovering over
the compatibility of the device with the purpose of the investigation, the
more stringent should be the conditions for applying the defense of
reasonableness.
Third, as the law does not grant affirmative powers to perform acts
that infringe privacy, but merely a retroactive discharge from liability, there
is no requirement for judicial review or accountability towards any body-
prior to or subsequent to the infringement. Review, so it seems, will only
take place in those cases where the subject appeals against the legality of
the injury. This process is largely a fiction because many of the infringe-
ments of privacy take place without the knowledge of the injured individ-
ual and consequently he is not aware of the possibility of appealing against
it. These problems are particularly serious in view of the doubtful effi-
ciency of many of these infringing devices.
Accordingly, I believe that it would be right to set qualifications on the
protection accorded to the above all-encompassing exemption, so that it
will only apply upon the existence of the following conditions:
1. Since the exemption cannot be regarded as an affirmative authori-
zation to infringe privacy, it is not possible to compel the security author-
ity to apply to the court in advance for a judicial warrant permitting the
infringement, but it is possible merely to compel it to apply to the court
shortly after commission of the infringement (or in the event of a continu-
ing infringement-shortly after the commencement of the
infringement). 
14 6
2. It is necessary to establish a duty to make an accounting at regular
intervals, including details of the number, nature, objectives, and results of
the infringements committed during the period of time being reported.
3. As stated in relation to the power to conduct covert searches, here
too it is necessary to apply the rule whereby the subject of the search is
notified of the infringement, after the security grounds justifying absence
of notification have ceased to exist.
D. Data Bases
The Protection of Privacy Law regulates the law applicable to data
bases and provides that every data base must be registered in a Register of
Data Bases, if one of the following situations applies:
1. The number of people in respect of whom there is information in the
data base exceeds 10,000;
2. The data base contains sensitive information;
145. J. STANLEY & B. STEINHARDT, supra note 68, at 3.
146. Stein, supra note 134, at 556.
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3. The data base contains information on people and the information was
not provided to this data base by them, or on their behalf or with their
consent;
4. The data base belongs to a public entity within the meaning of Section
23;
5. The data base is used for direct mailing as provided in Section 17C.
14 7
Whereas the rule entitles a person to peruse information about him-
self that is held in a data base, Section 13(e) negates the application of this
right to a data base controlled by a security authority. Additionally, the
Registrar of Data Bases manages a Register of Data Bases, which is open to
public inspection (the Register contains details of the identity of the owner
of the data base, the purpose for establishing it, the types of information
contained therein, and the like). Section 12 provides that for data bases of
a security authority, only the identity of the owner of the data base and the
purpose for establishing it are open to public inspection. An additional
qualification set out in the law provides that whereas a public body is pro-
hibited from divulging information regarding a person, Section 23B pro-
vides that the security authorities are not subject to this limitation and may
receive or transmit information, provided that the receipt or transmission
of information is required to fulfill their functions and is not prohibited by
law.
E. Other Infringements of Privacy:
1. Opening Post
Regulation 89 of the Defense Regulations grants the Post Censor
power to order the opening of any post that he believes may harm national
security or public safety. Regulation 90 grants postal office personnel who
have been so authorized by the Director of the Post Office the power to
demand that a sender of post present its contents for inspection as a condi-
tion for sending it through the post office.
2. Entering Premises Without Search
I. Section 6 of the Civil Aviation Law empowers the Minister of Trans-
port to order measures to be taken to safeguard the aviation facility in the
land adjacent to the facility, allowing those carrying out the measures to
enter the land, set up equipment, and enclose it. These measures do not
require the consent of the occupier of the land or judicial scrutiny, and a
person who believes that he has been injured by these orders is entitled to
apply to an appeals committee.
II. The GSS Law empowers GSS operatives to enter premises that are
not closed private buildings to carry out activities necessary to protect per-
sons, places or information within the responsibility of the GSS. Entry for
up to 12 hours does not necessitate the consent of the occupier of the
premises nor authorization by a court. Entry for a longer period of time
147. Section 8(c) of the Protection of Privacy Law, supra note 136.
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requires the consent of the occupier, and in its absence authorization by
the court.
In my opinion, it is highly doubtful whether the infringement permit-
ted by these two provisions is proportional. Section 7 of the Basic Law
prohibits entry into the private domain of an individual without his con-
sent whether the private domain is closed (for example, a house) or
whether it is open (for example, a yard). An all-embracing power to enter
open premises without the consent of the occupier and without judicial
scrutiny for up to 12 hours (in the GSS Law), and a fortiori without limita-
tion of time (in the Civil Aviation Law), is not proportional because in the
vast majority of cases, entry into premises is planned in advance and there
is ample time to apply to the court for a warrant. 148 Consequently, it
would be appropriate to modify these provisions and provide that every
entry into premises requires the consent of the occupier and, in the alterna-
tive, a judicial warrant, save in urgent circumstances where it is necessary
to effect immediate entry into the premises and time does not permit an
application to the court for a warrant (in which case entry into the prem-
ises should be permitted subject to an obligation to apply to the court for a
permit to remain in the premises).
3. Receipt of Communication Data
Section 11 of the GSS Law enables the head of the GSS to demand
statutory communication license holders (such as telephone and cable
companies) to transmit to the GSS information 149 located in data banks
tinder their control, if this is necessary to fulfill the functions of the GSS.
The law requires the head of the GSS to report periodically to the Prime
Minister, the Attorney General, and the Knesset Committee overseeing the
GSS. The application of the section depends on the establishment of regu-
lations regarding the types of information and the details of the report;
these regulations have not yet been promulgated. Likewise, Section 13 of
the Telecommunications Law 150 requires the licensee, upon being given an
order by the Minister of Communication, to provide telecommunication
services to the security services, 15 1 if considerations of national security
or public safety so require. Thus, for example, the Minister may require the
cellular telephone companies to install broadcasting antennas in certain
areas to allow the movements of their subscribers to be tracked.
Over many years, the State of Israel shaped its array of constitutional
balances between national security and individual rights, including the
right to privacy, under the shadow of continuous security threats. Accord-
148. See comments of the Israeli Citizens Rights Association regarding the GSS bill,
supra note 122.
149. Information for the purpose of this section does not apply to the content of a
conversation within the meaning of the Secret Monitoring Law, in contrast to identifying
details concerning the conversation.
150. Telecommunications Law, 5742-1982, S.H. 1060, 218.
151. For this purpose, "security forces" are defined as the Israel Defense Forces, the
Israel Police, the General Security Service, and the Intelligence and Special Duties
Branch. See Section 13(a) of the Telecommunications Law, id.
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ingly, it is not surprising that, while the events of September 11th led many
democratic countries to carry out far reaching changes to their traditional
array of balances,' 5 2 in Israel no real constitutional changes were under-
taken. Nonetheless, as we have seen, this fact alone is not evidence of the
appropriateness of the balances currently in place.
From the procedural point of view, the fact that current regulations are
spread over a large number of statutes makes it difficult to draw an overall
picture of the powers that infringe privacy on grounds of national security.
The substantive danger arising from this eclectic arrangement lies in the
need to examine the need for each of the powers from the micro perspective
of the statute within the framework of which the specific power is granted
(one tree in a wood) instead of from the macro perspective of the entire
body of powers granted by the various laws (the wood as a whole). The
outcome is the grant of gratuitous powers that infringe privacy to an
unnecessary extent.
An examination of the prevailing situation reveals that in many cases
this has indeed occurred. In addition to the conferral of gratuitous powers,
the laws occasionally permit the infringement of privacy without establish-
ing mechanisms for prior judicial review or even retroactive oversight
mechanisms and also fail to prescribe arrangements for notifying the indi-
vidual of the infringement of his rights.
An additional issue that must be considered in this context concerns
the lack of transparency regarding the manner of exercising the powers.
The Freedom of Information Law expressly prohibits a public authority
from transmitting information to a citizen or to a resident of the state that
may cause harm to national security or to the safety of the public.
153
Democracies, so it is said, die behind closed doors,' 5 4 because unre-
strained power tends to corrupt. 15 5 The absence of transparency makes it
more difficult both for the individual who has been harmed and for the
human rights organizations to bring these weighty issues before the courts;
consequently, despite the importance and critical character of these provi-
sions, they should not be interpreted over broadly.
I shall now turn to a discussion of the balances between the right to
privacy and national security established by a number of other democratic
states.
IV. A Comparative View
A. The United States
The right of a person to legal protection from having his privacy inter-
fered with by the law enforcement agencies is not expressly entrenched in
the constitutional documents of the United States, i.e., the Constitution
152. A broad comparative review of this issue is set out in the next section.
153. Section 9(a) of the Freedom of Information Law, 1998, S.H. 1667, 226.
154. Detroit Free Press et al. v. Ashcroft et al., 195 F. Supp 2d 937 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
155. 1. Osterdahl, Openness v. Secrecy: Public Access to Documents in Sweden and the
European Union, 23(4) E. L. REv. 336 (1998).
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and the Bill of Rights. 1 56 Nonetheless, over the years the Federal Supreme
Court has interpreted the Amendments to the Constitution, and chiefly the
Fourth Amendment, as granting express or implied constitutional protec-
tion to certain aspects of privacy.
157
Even though, prima facie, the Constitution establishes absolute
human rights, the fact that it does not refer to conditions for infringing
those rights has led the courts to recognize that they may be limited upon
the existence of critical public interests.
158
This section will open with a brief historical review of the activist
interpretation given by the Supreme Court to the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution and to the ramifications this interpretation has for the scope
of the protection accorded to the right to privacy. This will be followed by
an examination of the array of balances between national security and pri-
vacy that prevailed on the eve of the terrorist attacks of September 2001,
and I shall conclude by examining how the legal response offered by the
United States to these attacks has influenced this array of balances.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. 15
9
Unlike the legal situation in Israel, American law does not define the
term "search" in the Fourth Amendment. Until Katz v. United States in
1967,160 the courts interpreted this term in the light of the trespass doc-
trine, so that a search was conducted whenever a person's property rights
in his body or concrete assets were violated. 16 1
The more sophisticated the developments in electronic surveillance
technology became, the less this doctrine proved adequate to grant the indi-
vidual proper protection against the state's invasion of his private life.16 2
Thus, for example, monitoring the conversations of a person by means
which did not require physical entry into his premises was not regarded as
a search and therefore was not subject to the restrictions of the Fourth
Amendment. To remain loyal to the rationale underlying the Fourth
Amendment, the court adapted its interpretation to the changing times and
in the Katz case abolished the trespass doctrine and replaced it with the
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine. Holding that "the Fourth
156. D.H. Flaherty, On the Utility of Constitutional Rights to Privacy and Data Protec-
tion, 41 CASE W. L. REv. 831, 837 (1991).
157. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
158. L. Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410, 1420 (1974); Barak,
supra note 79, at 522.
159. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
160. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
161. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
162. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967).
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Amendment protects people not places,"' 63 the court stated that "search"
means infringement of a person's protected interest in the privacy of his
life:
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection .... But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected. 1
64
In an opinion, which later case law adopted as the guiding principle of
law, Justice Harlan interpreted this principle as comprising two cumulative
conditions:
First that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of pri-
vacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as "reasonable."'
165
In view of this ruling, it has been held that a person's subjective expec-
tation that no one will search the contents of garbage he has discarded in a
public place outside his home is not reasonable.1 66 Likewise, the expecta-
tion that air surveillance of movements in the private domain will not be
carried out is not reasonable, at least so long as the tracker is not assisted
by sophisticated technological aids or observes intimate activities. 16
7 Simi-
larly, tracking the location of a person with a beeper is not a search, so
long as the article in which the device has been placed is located in the
public domain so that the person's movements can be tracked without
technological assistance. Consequently, when the article is placed within a
private home, continued tracking will be deemed-to be a search.
168 Simi-
larly, use of a thermal imager to detect the amount of heat emitted from the
house of a person is regarded as a search, as the information acquired by
the tracker in relation to what is happening within the house could only
have been acquired by physical entry into its boundaries. 1
69 Regarding the
use of biometric measures, the Court has held that "[flingerprinting
involves none of the probing into an individual's private life and thoughts
that marks an interrogation or search."'
70
The Court also held as follows:
The physical characteristics of a person's voice, its tone and manner, as
opposed to the content of a specific conversation, are constantly exposed to
the public. Like a man's facial characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is
repeatedly produced for others to hear. No person can have a reasonable
expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than
163. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 361.
166. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
167. Dow Chemicals Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986); see FISHMAN &
McKENNA, supra note 41, at 29:11, 29-23.
168. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984); see United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
169. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
170. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
Cornell International Law Journal
he can reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to the world. 17 1
It follows from this reasoning that means of identification using voice,
signature, features, palm print, and fingerprints are not in the nature of a
search. However, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'Association,172 the
Court held that activities that entail entry into the body of a person (such
as a blood test) and activities that lead to the disclosure of medical infor-
mation about a person are activities that violate the individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy and consequently comprise a search. In view of this
reasoning, which was subsequent to that described above, all biometric
measures -including identification by means of voice, signature, features,
palm print, and fingerprints-that meet at least one of the two criteria, are
in the nature of a search.
Once it is decided that a particular act comprises a search, it must
satisfy the conditions of the Fourth Amendment to be regarded as constitu-
tional, i.e., it must be reasonable and carried out under a judicial warrant
that clearly defines the article that is being sought. The person applying
for the search warrant must have sworn an affidavit showing probable
cause for the involvement of the person who is the subject of the warrant in
an offense that has been committed or that is about to be committed.
However, over the years, the case law has established a number of
exceptions to the requirement for a warrant. The relevant exceptions for
our purposes are as follows:
A. Stop and frisk search: Law enforcement agencies are empowered
to detain any person who gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that he is
involved in criminal activities. During the course of the detention, the law
enforcement agent is entitled to search the person's clothes if he has rea-
sonable cause to believe that the latter is armed and therefore poses a dan-
ger to him or to the public.
173
B. Administrative search: As the application of the previous doctrine
is limited to situations where there is reasonable cause to suspect that a
person is dangerous, it does not provide an answer to situations where
locating weapons and explosives requires routine searches to be carried
out; for example, searches of the person and baggage of all the passengers
in a plane or visitors to a tourist site. To enable preventive searches to be
carried out, the case law has developed the doctrine of the administrative
search, which has been defined as a search that is conducted "as part of a
general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose,
rather than as part of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime
"174
Consequently, for a search to be regarded as administrative, the reason
for it must be compelling. This is undoubtedly the case for security
171. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973).
172. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Assoc., 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
173. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 673 (2d
Cir. 1972).
174. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973).
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searches aimed at uncovering weapons and explosives; the search must be
confined to achieving this purpose and it must be conducted following the
exercise of discretion based solely on relevant considerations.
175
Even after establishing this doctrine, the courts remained cognizant of
the severe injury caused to the privacy of innocent persons:
The intrusion into our privacy-and an intrusion it surely is-is accepted by
most travellers with equanimity .... The unavoidable consequence of this
exhaustive search for weapons is that security personnel will become aware
of many personal items that do not pose a danger to air safety. X-rays reveal,
in outline, the contents of packages, often giving a good indication as to
their inventory. When packages are opened, or when pockets are emptied,
FTS agents will see many items that are considered private.
1 76
However, in view of the huge devastation-both to people and to prop-
erty-that terrorist attacks may potentially cause, it has been held that the
benefits arising from conducting the search outweigh the inherent damage
entailed by the search, and accordingly it satisfies the constitutional test of
reasonableness. 177
C. Search by consent: The free and voluntary consent by a person to
have his body or personal effects searched negates the need for a warrant.
Thus, it may be said that a person who is aware that a search may be con-
ducted of his body or possessions in certain situations, such as prior to
boarding an airplane, and who freely puts himself in that situation, thereby
communicates his implied consent to the search.
17 8
In cases requiring a search warrant, the Fourth Amendment provides
that the court must issue it if the requirements of reasonableness and prob-
able cause are satisfied. In this context, the Court has held first that
"[wihether a particular search meets the reasonableness standard is judged
by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against its promotion of legitimate government interests."'
1 79
Secondly:
"Probable cause" is the standard by which a particular decision to search is
tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness .... In deter-
mining whether a particular inspection is reasonable-and thus in determin-
ing whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant for that inspection-
the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of these reasonable
goals of code enforcement.'
80
Relying on these pronouncements, it may be stated that in times of
emergency, when the state finds itself under terrorist attack or facing a real
threat of attack, it is possible to lower the standards for examining the
175. Id. at 910; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532, 536 (1967).
176. United States v. $124,570 United States Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1242-43 (9th
Cir. 1989).
177. Davis, 482 F.2d at 910.
178. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973); Unites States v.
Miner, 484 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1973).
179. Veronica School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995).
180. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35 (1967).
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existence of probable cause below the level of proof needed to obtain a
search warrant for ordinary criminal offenses. However, care must be
taken not to lower the standard of proof so excessively as to deprive of
meaning the requirement of proof of probable cause. 181
Against this backdrop, I shall now turn to an examination of the fed-
eral antiterrorism legislation prevailing prior to the attack of September 11,
2001.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act' 8 2 and the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act' 8 3 (ECPA) regulate the law apply-
ing to the monitoring of verbal communications and the monitoring of
electronic and wire communications. Monitoring depends upon a judicial
warrant, which may only be granted if the monitoring is sought within the
framework of a criminal investigation of an offense listed in the law, and if
the applicant has satisfied the stringent standard of proof, which requires
the following:
probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or
is about to commit a particular offence ... probable cause for belief that
particular communications concerning that offence will be obtained
through such interception . .. [and] normal investigative procedures have
been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if
tried or to be too dangerous.
184
Monitoring by means of pen register and trap and trace devices is con-
ducted by virtue of judicial warrants issued under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA)1 85 or the Pen/Trap Statute. '8 6 Probable cause need
not be shown to obtain a warrant; rather, it must be proved that the infor-
mation that will be seized is relevant to a criminal investigation or to an
investigation of international terrorism or foreign intelligence. Apart from
engaging in pen/trap monitoring within the framework of investigations
aimed at defending national security or gathering foreign intelligence, FISA
controls the legal regime applicable to electronic tapping, physical entry
into premises, and obtaining records-when these activities are required for
investigating the issues mentioned above. Unlike the stringent standard
Title III requires to obtain a judicial warrant, FISA requires a lower stan-
dard; save if the suspect is a citizen of the United States, in which case
probable cause is required of his involvement in activities contravening the
criminal law.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 18 7 was enacted in
the aftermath of the first terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in 1993 and
181. E. Gross, The Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human Rights in the United States:
The Aftermath of September 11, 2001, 28 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 31 (2002).
182. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1968).
183. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
184. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 2518.
185. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2000).
187. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. § 1214 (1996).
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the terrorist attack on the federal offices building in Oklahoma City in
1995. Among its provisions, Section 804 allows governmental bodies to
compel communication providers to preserve their records regarding cus-
tomers who are suspected of having committed offenses, for an initial
period of ninety days, subject to an option to extend the period for an addi-
tional identical period.
Section 303 requires every financial institution that knows it pos-
sesses monies associated with a foreign terrorist organization to continue
to hold those funds and concurrently report their existence to the authori-
ties. Section 701 removes from the application of Title III information
stored in communication systems used for storing and transferring monies,
thereby lessening the standard of proof that authorities must meet when
seeking information about bank accounts.
On September 11, 2001, the American people experienced one of the
most shocking and brutal events in their history. Perhaps it was the sight
of the passenger planes crashing, one after the other, into one of the best-
known symbols of America; perhaps it was the huge frustration generated
by the inability to save the thousands of people caught up in this disaster,
whose lives were ended in an act of indescribable cruelty; or perhaps it was
the sight of the collapse, destruction, and ruin, but it seemed that the
nation as a whole was swept by a sense of cultural and social change-
individualism compacted in favor of the general welfare, and individuals
displayed a greater willingness than before to sacrifice their freedoms in
favor of national interests.
The American government hastened to initiate legislation that
reflected this change-not only in its title-"Patriot Act" 18 8 -but also in the
unequivocal tilting of the constitutional balance in favor of national secur-
ity needs at the expense of individual rights.
Even though the purpose of the law is to strengthen the ability of the
law enforcement agencies to fight terrorism, many of the statutory provi-
sions may be used in ordinary criminal investigations. Likewise, in a num-
ber of situations, the statutory provisions negate the court's discretion and
turn it into a rubber stamp engaging purely in symbolic judicial review.
The examples of this are many and I shall confine myself here to those
touching upon the right to privacy.
Prior to the enactment of the law, the rules of criminal procedure and
the judgments of the state courts interpreted the Fourth Amendment as
compelling the law enforcement agencies to notify a person of a search that
was about to be carried out in his premises (knock and announce princi-
ple), save where certain exceptions applied that varied from state to state
and that allowed covert searches to be carried out subject to retroactive
188. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272.
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notification.1 39 As a result of claims by the law enforcement agencies that
the variations in the laws of the various states undermined interstate inves-
tigations, including investigations of terrorism, the Patriot Act established
a uniform federal standard. Under this standard, in criminal investiga-
tions, the court is empowered to authorize a search without prior notice
being given, upon reasonable proof that notice would have a deleterious
effect on the investigation (for example, it might endanger the life or well-
being of a person, allow a person to abscond, interfere with evidence, or
frighten witnesses). 190
Prior to this law, the FISA granted the FBI power to apply to the court
for an order compelling a closed list of bodies to hand over records in their
possession regarding a person in respect of whom there were "specific and
articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to whom the
records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power." 19 1
The Patriot Act significantly expands this power by enabling the FBI to
demand not only records but also "any tangible things," not only from the
closed list of bodies but from any body or person (such as a book shop or
internet service provider), and not only in cases where there is reason to
believe that the subject of the information request is a foreign agent, but
where any person is involved. The judicial supervision of the exercise of
the power is a pretense because once the FBI has informed the court that it
needs the information for the purpose of an authorized investigation relat-
ing to international terrorism or secret foreign intelligence, the judge has
no discretion to refuse. Moreover, the body or person obliged to hand over
the information is prohibited from telling this to anyone else, even in cases
where there is no security justification for secrecy, and consequently the
person whose privacy has been infringed will never know of it and natu-
rally will not be able to challenge the legality of the search.
1 9 2
As we have seen, even before the Patriot Act, the obstacle to obtaining
a judicial pen/trap order was overcome relatively easily. Section 216 of the
Act expands this power even further in three respects: 193 first, whereas in
the past the validity of the warrant was limited to the area of jurisdiction of
the court that issued the order, now courts are entitled to issue warrants
valid throughout the United States, and there is also no requirement to
identify the article that is the subject of the search. Second, the Act clari-
fies that it is possible to monitor not only telephone communication net-
works but also a range of other communication technologies-a pre-Act
contentious issue. 194 Third, the Act expands the types of pen/trap infor-
mation that may be made the subject of the order; however, because it does
not contain an explicit definition distinguishing between content and pen/
189. See the guidelines of the Department of Justice regarding implementation of the
powers under the law, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/DOJ_guidance.pdf
(last visited Aug. 6, 2003).
190. USA PATRIOT Act § 213 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3103a).
191. 50 U.S.C. § 1862.
192. USA PATRIOT Act § 215 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1816).
193. USA PATRIOT Act § 216 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c)).
194. Guidelines of the Department of Justice, supra note 189.
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trap information, there is room here for an expansive interpretation. Thus,
for example, there is a dispute whether the addresses of internet sites
should be seen as purely technical information or as information relating
to content, as they have the potential to disclose personal information
about the areas of interest of the user.195
Section 214 of the Act expands the situations in which a pen/trap war-
rant will be granted under FISA, stating that an order may be sought in
"any investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concern-
ing a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities."'
96
Sections 201 and 202 broaden the application of Title III to investiga-
tions of terror offenses, offenses relating to the manufacture and distribu-
tion of chemical weapons and computer offenses, and thereby allow a
wiretapping order to be granted in respect of them.' 9 7 Because FISA in any
event grants broad powers to monitor persons suspected of involvement in
international terrorism, it follows that the dominant purpose of the amend-
ment is to enable the monitoring of a United States citizen and domestic
terrorist suspects. 198 In addition to the far ranging surveillance powers
available under Title III and FISA, as of October 31, 2001, regulations have
come into force that enable conversations between a prisoner and his attor-
ney to be monitored without a court order in cases where there is a suspi-
cion that the prisoner will try to transfer information endangering national
security through his attorney. However, it should be noted that the regula-
tions require that notification of monitoring be given to the attorney and
his client. 19 9
In the past, when a criminal investigation was underway, the law
enforcement agencies could issue an administrative subpoena compelling
suppliers of electronic communication services to hand over limited infor-
mation regarding their subscribers (such as their name, address, and tele-
phone account). Section 210 of the Act expands the type of information
that may be sought under the subpoena to include, inter alia, information
regarding the subscriber's means of payment (such as the credit card num-
ber or bank account number) and records of the dates and hours of surfing
on the internet.
In the past it was possible to apply under FISA for a warrant for elec-
tronic surveillance and search of premises for investigations that had the
sole purpose of gathering foreign intelligence. Section 218 expands the
application of FISA to investigations where intelligence gathering is a signif-
icant purpose but not the sole purpose. As the ground for application is
195. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SURVEILLANCE UNDER THE USA PATRIOT ACT, at
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12263c=206 (last visited Aug. 5, 2003).
196. USA PATRIOT Act § 214 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1842).
197. USA PATRIOT Act §§ 201, 202 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(1), 2516(1)(C)).
198. The broad definition of "domestic terrorism" given in § 802 gives rise to the
danger that this power will be exploited against legitimate political opponents of the
regime. Gross, supra note 181, at 6.
199. National Security; Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg.
55,062 (Oct. 31, 2001).
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vague, there is a danger that it will be construed broadly so that the easier
statutory standard will also be used for criminal investigations.
Section 203 enables the federal law enforcement agencies to exchange
information regarding foreign intelligence, originating from wiretapping,
without judicial oversight and without requiring the information to be con-
nected to the investigation where wiretapping was allowed. Likewise, the
section enables the authorities to receive information in the possession of a
grand jury that relates to foreign intelligence.
Section 206 enables a roving wiretap order to be granted, under FISA,
to every communications medium used by the subject of the surveillance,
if it is proved that he regularly changes his means of communication and
thereby thwarts the investigation. The Act does not require the authority to
ensure that the subject is indeed using the particular means of communica-
tion prior to conducting the wiretap, and therefore the danger arises that
innocent people will be monitored.
Section 209 removes the monitoring of vocal mail messages from the
application of Title III and also lowers the standard that must be satisfied
to monitor them.
Section 212 enables electronic communication providers to volunta-
rily divulge to the law enforcement agencies records relating to their sub-
scribers in emergency cases involving immediate danger of death or
serious physical injury to any person.
Section 217 enables victims of computer attacks to ask the authorities
to locate the attacker, and for this purpose the authorities are empowered
to monitor activities of the owner of the trespassing computer without a
search warrant.
Section 351 permits any financial institution to voluntarily divulge to
the authorities information relating to financial transactions that are sus-
pected of violating U.S. laws, without bearing liability for breach of
confidence.
It should be pointed out that despite the significant expansion of its
powers the government remains of the opinion that it is insufficiently
equipped to wage its war against terror. Accordingly, it is now seeking to
augment its powers by enacting the Domestic Enhancement Security Act.
This Act would infringe the right to privacy-as well as other fundamental
rights-even more severely than its predecessor.2 0 0 Thus, inter alia, Sec-
tion 101 expands the application of FISA by amending the definition of
people included in the term "foreign power." Section 102 would enable the
monitoring of any person who is suspected of engaging in clandestine
intelligence gathering activities for a foreign power, even if his activities are
not unlawful. Section 103 provides that electronic surveillance, physical
searches, or pen registers may be used for a period of 15 days following a
congressional declaration of war or terrorist attack without obtaining a
200. Comments of the American Civil Liberties Union regarding the bill, at http://
www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=11835&c=206 (last visited August 5,
2003).
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search order. Section 126 enables the government to obtain the credit
records of any person without a search warrant. Sections 128 and 129
enable the authorities to issue administrative subpoenas when a terrorist
investigation is underway, requiring any person or body to divulge infor-
mation in his possession without need for a court order.
B. Canada
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 20 1 like the constitu-
tional documents of the United States, does not expressly entrench the
right to privacy. Accordingly, the Canadian courts have followed the exam-
ple of their American colleagues and have interpreted Section 8 of the Char-
ter 20 2 -which confers protection upon the individual against unreasonable
searches-as impliedly entrenching the individual's reasonable expectation
of privacy.
20 3
The restriction of rights set out in the Charter, like the restriction of
rights established by Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, is only con-
stitutional if it satisfies the requirements of the limitation clause set out in
Section 1.204 First, it must be made by virtue of law. Second, it must be
the type of restriction that may be justified in the light of the values of a
free and democratic society, i.e., the purpose of the limitation must be to
serve essential social needs-"concerns that are pressing and substan-
tial."20 5 Third, it must be reasonable, i.e., the proper purpose must be
achieved by selecting the means that cause the least harm to the protected
right or freedom.
20 6
The two principal federal statutes protecting privacy are the Privacy
Act 20 7 and the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents
Act (PIPEDA).
2 ° 8
The Privacy Act regulates the modes of gathering, use, and disclosure
of personal information in the hands of the federal authorities. Section 4
provides that the authorities are empowered to gather information regard-
ing individuals to the extent that it relates directly to an operating program
or activity of the institution. Section 8 prohibits the disclosure of this infor-
mation, without the consent of the individual to whom it relates, save in a
number of exceptional cases, including disclosure following a request by a
law enforcement agency that needs the information for its investigations
201. Charter of Rights and Freedoms Constitution Act, 1982.
202. Id. Section 8 of the Charter provides as follows: "Everyone has the right to be
secure against unreasonable search or seizure."
203. Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc., 2 S.C.R. 145, 159 (1984).
204. Charter of Rights and Freedoms Constitution Act, ]o982. Section 1 of the Char-
ter provides as follows: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
205. R. v. Oakes, 1 S.C.R. 103, 138 (1986).
206. Id.
207. Privacy Act, R.S. 1985, c. P-21.
208. Bill C-6, Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act,
Assented to Apr. 13, 2000.
Cornell International Law Journal
and disclosure in cases where the public interest in disclosure outweighs
the damage that may be caused to the individual by the invasion of his
privacy.
Section 12 grants every individual who is a Canadian citizen or a per-
manent resident access to any personal information relating to that indi-
vidual under the control of a government institution, subject to a number
of exceptions. Thus, for example, Section 22 provides that the authority is
entitled to refuse to disclose any personal information requested that was
obtained by any investigative government institution during a criminal
investigation, pertaining to the enforcement of any law of Canada or an
investigation pertaining to activities suspected of constituting threats to the
security of Canada. Another exception to the right of access is set out in
Section 25, which enables an institution to refuse a request where disclo-
sure could reasonably be expected to threaten the safety of individuals.
PIPEFA establishes the law applicable to personal information held by
private commercial bodies whose activities are regulated by federal laws
(such as communication companies, banks, and airline companies).
20 9
Inter alia, Section 7(3) enables those companies to disclose information in
their control, without the knowledge or consent of the person to whom it
relates, if the information has been requested by a government institution
that has indicated that it suspects that the information relates to national
security, the defense of Canada, or the conduct of international affairs, or if
the disclosure is requested for the purpose of enforcing any law of Canada
for which it is responsible. Likewise, the section enables bodies subject to
the law to voluntarily disclose information to the law enforcement agencies
if they suspect that the information concerns national security, the defense
of Canada, or the conduct of international affairs.
Section 9(2) provides that a body asked by an individual to inform
him when his information is disclosed to a government institution is
obliged to inform the government institution concerned regarding the
request, and that institution is entitled to prohibit the body from comply-
ing with the request if it has reasonable cause to believe that complying
with the request will harm national security, the defense of Canada, or
international relations.
On the criminal level, the Criminal Code2 10 provides that, as a rule,
search warrants are required to conduct searches; however, a law enforce-
ment official is entitled to conduct a search of a person, vehicle, or prem-
ises (which are not used as residences) without a search warrant if he has
reasonable cause to believe that they unlawfully contain weapons or explo-
sives and the conditions for obtaining a search warrant exist but because of
the urgency of the matter he is unable to obtain it.
2 1 1
Likewise, the Criminal Code states that the law enforcement agencies
209. Beginning in January 2004, the Act is due to broaden its application to all private
bodies that collect, use, or transmit personal information as part of their commercial
activities. See id. § 30.
210. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-46.
211. Criminal Code § 117.02.
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are entitled to monitor private communications 2 12 by virtue of a search
warrant, which shall not be given unless the court is persuaded that "other
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed, other procedures
are unlikely to succeed or the urgency of the matter is such that it would be
impractical to carry out the investigation of the offence using only other
investigative procedures."
21 3
The severity of the infringement to the privacy of a person being moni-
tored has led the court to hold that the appropriate balance between the
public interest in the proper conduct of criminal investigations and the
right of the individual to privacy requires a stringent interpretation of the
above requirements.
2 14
Monitoring without a warrant is only possible in cases where there is
reasonable cause to believe that immediate monitoring, which does not
leave time to apply for a judicial warrant, is essential to prevent the com-
mission of an offense likely to cause serious damage to a person or
property.
215
The rules applicable to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
when gathering information are set out in the Canadian Security Intelli-
gence Service Act. 2 16 The intelligence service is empowered to gather
information concerning activities that give reasonable cause to suspect that
they may endanger the security of Canada (such as espionage and the
threat to commit violent acts against people or property with the purpose
of promoting political, religious, or ideological objectives). 217 The infor-
mation must be gathered under a judicial search warrant, 2 18 which will
only be issued upon proof of reasonable cause for belief that the surveil-
lance activities are essential for a security investigation or to fulfill the
duties of the service, or after proving that other investigative means have
been tried and have failed or cannot be expected to succeed, or that
because of the urgency of the investigation using any other techniques to
gather information would lead to the investigation being thwarted, or that
failure to issue the warrant would mean that information necessary for
ensuring the security of Canada or fulfilling the functions of the service
212. Section 183 of the Criminal Code defines private communication as follows:
"Private communication" means any oral communication, or any telecommuni-
cation, that is made by an originator who is in Canada or is intended by the
originator to be received by a person who is in Canada and that is made under
circumstances in which it is reasonable for the originator to expect that it will
not be intercepted by any person other than the person intended by the origina-
tor to receive it, and includes any radio-based telephone communication that is
treated electronically or otherwise for the purpose of preventing intelligible
reception by any person other than the person intended by the originator to
receive it.
213. Criminal Code § 186.
214. R. v. Araujo, 2 S.C.R. 992 (2000).
215. Criminal Code § 184.4.
216. Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-23.
217. Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act §§ 2, 12.
218. Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (RE) (T.D.), 1 F.C. (Ottawa) 420
(1998).
Cornell International Law Journal
would not be gathered. 219
Likewise, the Act sets out the circumstances in which the service is
entitled to transfer to various bodies information in its control;220 for
example, when this is necessary to fulfill its functions or when the informa-
tion relates to international relations or to the defense of Canada.
The Emergencies Act 2 2 1 provides that when a state of international
emergency 222 has been declared, it is possible to enter and search any vehi-
cle or premises (including a residential home) and search any person
found therein-without a search warrant.
Under the influence of the attack of September 11 th, Canada-like the
United States-believed that the existing balance between human rights
and security needs left it with insufficient tools to effectively fight terror-
ism.2 23 The tragedy that had struck its neighbor, as well as the desire to
ensure that it itself would not fall victim to a similar disaster, led to the
enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act, Bill C-36, less than three months after
the attack on the United States. 22
4
The provisions of the Act significantly expand the powers of the gov-
ernment while concurrently restricting many of the freedoms and rights of
the individual, including the right to privacy.
Concurrently with a vague definition of the acts that are deemed to be
terrorist acts, the law significantly broadens the investigative powers of the
law enforcement agencies and limits the access of the individual to infor-
mation on grounds of national security. Thus, for example, in amending
the criminal code, the Act states as follows: first, every Canadian citizen or
permanent resident must report to the authorities immediately upon
becoming aware that he is holding property that belongs to a terrorist
organization or to someone on its behalf, and he is also obliged to report
any transaction or commercial offer relating to that property. 22 5 Second, a
number of bodies, including foreign banks operating in Canada and credit
companies, must carry out routine checks to ascertain whether they are
holding property belonging to a terrorist organization or someone acting
219. Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act § 21.
220. Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act § 19.
221. Emergencies Act, R.S. 1985, c. 22 (4th Supp.), § 30(1)(d).
222. A state of international emergency is defined as follows:
"'International emergency' means an emergency involving Canada and one or more
other countries that arises from acts of intimidation or coercion or the real or imminent
use of serious force or violence and that is so serious as to be a national emergency."
Emergencies Act § 27.
223. K. Roach, Did September 11 Change Everything? Struggling to Preserve Canadian
Values in the Face of Terrorism, 47 McGILL LJ. 893, 895 (2002); Sj. Toope, Fallout From
"9-11": Will a Security Culture Undermine Human Rights? 65 SASK. L. REv. 281, 287
(2002).
224. Bill C-36, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, the Official Secrets Act, the
Canada Evidence Act, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and Other Acts,
and to enact measures respecting the registration of charities, in order to combat terror-
ism, 1st Sess., 37th Parl., 2001 (Assented to Dec. 18, 2001, S.C. 2001, c. 41) (hereinafter
Bill C-36).
225. Criminal Code § 83.1 (as amended by Bill C-36).
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on its behalf. These bodies must report their findings periodically.
2 26
Third, the Act empowers the courts to issue search warrants of premises if
they are persuaded of the existence of reasonable cause to suspect that they
contain property that is subject to confiscation under the law.22 7 Fourth,
whereas, as noted, the Criminal Code establishes a strict standard for issu-
ing a wiretap warrant within the context of an investigation of ordinary
criminal offenses, the amendment provides that when the wiretap is sought
within the context of an investigation of terrorist offenses, a much easier
standard must be met, which only requires proof that the sought after wire-
tap is the most effective means in the circumstances of the case. 228 Fifth,
the Act provides that within the context of a terror investigation, a judge is
entitled to issue an order in an "investigative hearing" that requires every
person to answer questions and hand over articles in his control, unless
these acts infringe the duty of secrecy owed by that person under law.
22 9
In amending the National Defense Act, the bill provides that it is possi-
ble to monitor private communications without a judicial warrant, upon
authorization by the Minister of Defense, if the sole purpose of monitoring
is to gather foreign intelligence, and on condition that it is directed at an
alien located outside Canada, that there is no reasonable possibility of
acquiring the information by other means, that the information is likely to
be of great value, and that sufficient means were taken to ensure the pri-
vacy of the citizens and residents of Canada and to ensure that the informa-
tion would only be used to the extent necessitated by security needs, the
defense of Canada, and international relations.
2 30
Likewise, the Minister is empowered to monitor private communica-
tions, if the sole purpose thereof is to protect the government's computer
systems and networks, and on condition that monitoring is essential to
protect the computer systems and networks, that there is no reasonable
possibility of acquiring the information by other means, that there is no
reasonable possibility of obtaining the consent of people who are likely to
be the subjects of the monitoring, and that the necessary steps were taken
to ensure the privacy of the citizens and residents of the state and to ensure
that the information would only be used to the extent necessary to achieve
the objective of the monitoring.
23 1
In amending the Money Laundering Act,23 2 the bill provides that upon
the existence of reasonable cause to suspect an attempt to smuggle finan-
cial resources in or out of the country, a police officer is entitled to search
transport vehicles, cargo, or mail entering or taken out of the jurisdiction
of the state.
226. Id. § 83.11 (as amended by Bill C-36).
227. Id. § 83.13 (as amended by Bill C-36).
228. Id. § 186 (1.1) (as amended by Bill C-36).
229. This provision is in force until December 31, 2006, save if it will be extended
prior thereto. Id. §§ 83.28, 83.32 (as amended by Bill C-36).
230. National Defense Act, R.S. c. N-5 § 273.65(1)(2) (as amended by Bill C-36).
231. Id. § 273.65(3)(4) (as amended by Bill C-36).
232. Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, 2000, c. 17,
§§ 16, 17.1 (as amended by Bill C-36).
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In amending the Privacy Act and the Personal Information Protection
and Electronic Documents Act, the bill provides that a person may not see
the information relating to him held by the bodies subject to these Acts
where a certificate of privilege has been issued prohibiting disclosure of
the information. 2 33 Likewise, the bill states that the certificate of privilege




Despite possessing a democratic tradition that has evolved over hun-
dreds of years, the United Kingdom has refrained from entrenching its
commitment to individual rights and freedoms in a written constitutional
document.
In 1998, Parliament passed the Human Rights Act, which gave domes-
tic effect to the provisions of the European Convention on Human
Rights. 235 Thus, the right to privacy, which is explicitly protected in Arti-
cle 8 of the Convention, acquired binding legal force. 23 6
A number of statutes protect various aspects of the right to privacy;
the most important of these is the Data Protection Act,2 37 which estab-
lishes the legal regime for data held by public and private bodies. Accord-
ing to the Act, these bodies must register the type of data held by them, the
purpose for collecting the data, and their use with the Office of the Infor-
mation Commissioner-an independent public body that is responsible for
managing the register and enforcing the statutory provisions. Likewise, the
Act grants every person the right to request notification whenever action is
taken to collect or use data relating to him, and prohibits the bodies subject
to the Act from collecting, using, or disclosing data outside the framework
of the means and purposes established for collecting and managing it.
However, these provisions do not apply when to do so would harm
national security.
238
In the year 2000, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act was
passed.2 39 This Act grants the investigatory bodies extremely broad pow-
233. Privacy Act, R.S. 1985, c. P-21, § 70.1 (as amended by Bill C-36); Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act § 4.1 (as amended by Bill C-36).
234. Access to Information Act, R.S. c. A-l, § 69.1 (as amended by Bill C-36).
235. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42.
236. Id. Article 8 of the Convention provides as follows:
Right to Respect for Private and Family Life
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
237. Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29.
238. Id. §§ 7, 17, 28, 55.
239. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23.
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ers, without the need to obtain judicial warrants. The extent to which this
Act is compatible with the provisions of the European Convention on
Human Rights is open to grave question. Thus, inter alia, the Act enables
the Secretary of State for Defense to authorize the interception of communi-
cations transferred by means of the postal service or telecommunication
systems, if this is necessary for reasons of national security, as part of the
investigation of serious crimes or to safeguard the economic well-being of
the United Kingdom. 240 Likewise, the Act enables the Defense Secretary to
require these service providers to adjust their systems to enable this moni-
toring to take place.
24 1
Section 22 enables orders to be issued to these service providers to
disclose identifying communication data-as opposed to content informa-
tion-to the legal authorities relating to the users of their services, if this is
necessary, inter alia, on grounds of national security, public safety, the
investigation of serious crime, or safeguarding the economic well-being of
the state. Likewise, the Act enables the Defense Secretary or other author-
ized officials to authorize human surveillance on grounds of national
security. 24 2 Section 49 provides that it is possible to demand any person
who is in possession of the key to any encoded electronic address to dis-
close it to the authorities if reasons of national security, public safety,
investigation of serious crime, or safeguarding the economic well-being of
the state so require.
A number of statutes grant the police wide powers to search the body
and premises of a person. Thus, for example, Section 1 of the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act enables a constable to search any vehicle or person
located in a public place, without a search warrant, if he has reasonable
cause to suspect that weapons, explosives, or equipment intended for use
in the commission of a crime are unlawfully present there.24 3 Section 8
authorizes a justice of the peace to issue a search warrant for premises if he
is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a serious
arrestable offense has been committed and that there is material in the
premises that is likely to be of "substantial value" to the investigation of the
offense.
Section 17 authorizes a constable to enter and search any premises to
arrest a person for an arrestable offense, where he has reasonable grounds
for believing that the person whom he is seeking is on the premises. Simi-
larly, Section 18 authorizes a constable to enter and search any premises
occupied by a person who is under arrest for an arrestable offense, without
a search warrant, if he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is
on the premises evidence that relates to that offense; or to some other
arrestable offense connected with or similar to that offense. Section 60
enables police commanders to authorize their subordinates to search every
240. Id. § 5.
241. Id. § 12.
242. Id.§§ 26-45.
243. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 1.
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vehicle or person located in a cordoned area, where there is reasonable
cause to believe that serious violent offenses will be committed there.
In the year 2000, the Terrorism Act was passed, incorporating numer-
ous provisions that significantly infringe the right to privacy. 244 Thus, for
example, Section 19 provides that a person commits an offense if he does
not disclose to a constable as soon as is reasonably practicable that infor-
mation has come to his attention in the course of his business leading him
to reasonably suspect that another person is supporting terrorists finan-
cially, is assisting in obtaining financial support, is performing actions
aimed at money laundering for terrorist purposes, or knowingly holds
property intended for terrorist purposes. Section 20 permits-but does not
compel-a person to disclose to a constable that he suspects that money or
other property is terrorist property, and Section 21 provides that a person
who participates in activities supporting terrorist acts as aforesaid shall not
be liable for his involvement therein if he makes a disclosure on his own
initiative to the police immediately after suspecting that he was involved in
prohibited activities.
Likewise, the Act states that during the course of terrorist investiga-
tions, a constable may apply for a judicial warrant authorizing him to
search premises and any person found therein. The judge may only give
this order if he is persuaded that there is reasonable cause to believe that in
the said premises there are articles of substantive value in advancing the
investigation and that the grant of the warrant is essential in the
circumstances.
24 5
In addition, during the course of investigating terror, a judge is enti-
tled to issue an order requiring a financial institution to divulge defined
customer information in its possession, such as the customer's account
number, full name, date of birth, address, and the date on which the finan-
cial institution and the customer begins or ends a business relationship.
The order will only be granted on proof that the order will enhance the
effectiveness of the investigation.2 46 Section 39 of the Act provides that
where a person knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that a constable
is conducting or proposes to conduct a terrorist investigation, the person
commits an offense if he discloses to another anything that is likely to
prejudice the investigation.
Section 42 provides that a judge may on the application of a constable
issue a warrant for specified premises if he is satisfied that there are rea-
sonable grounds for suspecting that a person whom the constable reasona-
bly suspects to be a person who is or has been concerned in the
commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism is to be found
there.
Likewise, the Act provides that a constable may arrest without a war-
rant a person whom he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist; moreover, he
244. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (the Act came into force in February 2001).
245. Id. § 37.
246. Id. § 38.
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may search a person arrested under Section 41 to discover whether he pos-
sesses anything that may constitute evidence that he is a terrorist. A con-
stable may also search a person suspected of being a terrorist, even without
arresting him.
24 7
A particularly draconian power set out in the law enables police com-
manders to authorize constables to search every vessel or person located in
a defined area, if they believe that this is expedient to prevent acts of terror-
ism. Even though this power allows the invasion of the privacy of people
who are not suspected of having committed any offense, the Act does not
require prior judicial scrutiny or even retroactive scrutiny, of the exercise of
the power. Only two restrictions are imposed on this power: first, that the
commander reports the grant of authorization to the Secretary of State for
Defense as soon as is reasonably practicable-the Secretary of State may
then modify or cancel the authorization; second, that the authorization will
be valid for a maximum period of 28 days, following which it must be
renewed in a new process.
24 8
The terrorist attack on the United States also had an impact on the
United Kingdom. Like the governments of the United States and Canada,
which hastened to initiate legal legislative action clearly according superi-
ority to security interests over individual rights, the United Kingdom also
believed that the balance of interests established in its statutes failed to
provide it with sufficient tools to defend the country against terrorists,
249
and consequently, even though only a few months had elapsed since the
Terrorism Act entered into force, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security
Act was passed.
2 50
Among its provisions, the latter Act broadens the range of customer
information that financial institutions must divulge under the Terrorism
Act to also include information regarding the customer's account in that
institution.
2 51
Section 17 of the Act expands the duty of disclosure of certain public
authorities to cases where the information is sought in the context of an
investigation or criminal procedure.
Section 19 permits the tax authorities to voluntarily disclose informa-
tion in their possession, if such disclosure is not prohibited under the Data
Protection Act, to facilitate the carrying out by any of the intelligence ser-
vices of any of that service's functions or for any criminal investigation or
criminal proceedings.
247. Id. §§ 41, 43.
248. Id. §§ 44-46.
249. See the explanatory notes to the Act, prepared by government offices: "The pur-
pose of this Act is to build on legislation in a number of areas to ensure that the Govern-
ment, in the light of the new situation arising from the September 11 terrorist attacks on
New York and Washington, have the necessary powers to counter the threat to the UK,"
at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/en/2001en24.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2003).
250. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24.
251. Id. § 3.
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The Act also provides that a judge may issue a warrant to search prem-
ises if he is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that
evidence of the commission of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons
related offenses is to be found on any premises. The power to search prem-
ises includes the power to search any persons present therein as well as
those suspected of concealing evidence connected to the commission of the
aforesaid offenses. 25 2 Other statutory provisions require all persons to
inform the Secretary of State for Defense of their intention to keep danger-
ous substances on their premises. The police are authorized to require all
persons holding such substances to inform them of the security measures
taken when handling them, as well as the identity of persons having access
to the substances or to the premises in which they are kept. Likewise, the
police are entitled to enter and search premises in which dangerous sub-
stances are held to ensure the security of the substances. 25 3
In addition, the Act enables the Secretary of State to establish proce-
dures relating to the retention of communications data to safeguard
national security, to prevent or detect crime, or to prosecute offenders that
may relate directly or indirectly to national security. 254
D. The European Union
The institutions and powers of the European Community are set out in
the line of conventions that established the Community.2 55
Its activities are based on primary legal sources (public international
law, Community treaties, treaties between the Community and foreign
states and supraprinciples relating to human freedoms and rights), as well
as secondary legal sources (regulations, directives, and decisions).
Both in areas of jurisdiction transferred by the member states to the
Communities and in areas reserved by them, the states are committed to
complying with the rules of public international law. However, special
restrictions apply to those matters transferred to the jurisdiction of the
Community, as these cannot contradict the constitutional traditions com-
mon to the member states, as established by the international treaties to
which the Community is a party or to which the member states are
party.2
5 6
In this context, three treaties are particularly worthy of mention. The
first is the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, which was signed in Rome in November 1950 and
which provides in Article 8 for the individual's right to respect for private
and family life.2 57 Second, is the Treaty on the European Union, which
252. Id. § 52.
253. Id. §§ 59-61, 65.
254. Id. § 102.
255. E. LEv, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 21 (1994).
256. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 5-13 (N.A. Neuwahl & A. Rosas eds.,
1995); Case 4/73 Nold v. Commission 491 (1974).
257. The European Convention on Human Rights (1950), at http://www.hrcr.org/
docs/EurConvention/euroconv2.htmI (last visited Aug. 10, 2003).
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declares the Union's commitment to respect for the basic rights set out in
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and to con-
ducting a joint foreign and security policy, which has as its objective
strengthening the security of the Union, the security of the member states,
international safety, and the democratic rule of law.2 58 Third, is the Nice
Convention signed in the year 2000, in which the Union declared that it is
founded on principles of freedom, democracy and the rule of law and in
Article 7 declared its commitment to respect for the individual's right to
privacy.
25 9
In a variety of directives, the Community has proclaimed its objectives
on a range of legal issues within its jurisdiction. Each member state is
required to adapt its domestic laws to these directives as the Community's
laws in these areas supersede the states' internal laws.
260
In October 1995, the Community issued the Data Protection Direc-
tive, 26 1 which was intended to harmonize the various state laws 26 2 relating
to the gathering, processing, and disclosure-both automatic and manual-
of personal information.2 63 However, it is important to note that the provi-
sions of the directive are not designed to regulate the data laws in the areas
of national security and criminal law.
26 4
The Directive requires the member states to establish a legal regime
that will ensure the fair and legal collection and processing of personal
data, for clear and defined purposes, and the establishment of appropriate
regulations for data protection. Special restrictions apply to the processing
of sensitive data on such matters as race, nationality, religion, health, and
political and ideological beliefs. Likewise, the Directive requires the states
to refrain from transferring their citizens' personal data to states that do
not grant appropriate protection to personal data, and to establish an inde-
pendent public body (controller) to be responsible for the enforcement of
258. See http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/titlel.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2003).
259. The European Charter of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, at http://
www.europarl.eu.int/charter/pdf/text-en.pdf (last visited August 10, 2003).
260. Case 6/64 Costa v. Enel 585 (1964).
261. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of October
24, 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data (hereinafter Data Protection Directive).
262. See Paragraph 1 referring to the "Object of the Directive":
1. In accordance with this Directive, member states shall protect the funda-
mental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in particular their right to
privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.
2. Member states shall neither restrict nor prohibit the free flow of personal
data between member states for reasons connected with the protection afforded
under Paragraph 1.
Id. par. 1.
263. Paragraph 2 of the Directive defines personal data as follows:
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data
subject'); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indi-
rectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more
factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity.
Id. par. 2.
264. Data Protection Directive, supra note 261, Art. 3.
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privacy laws to be enacted in the future in compliance with the provisions
of the Directive.
In 1997, the Data Protection Telecommunication Directive 26 5 was
authorized, containing restrictions on the collection and processing of data
by means of telecommunication systems. Inter alia, the Directive requires
the member states to enact laws prohibiting the monitoring and storage of
electronic data and also limits the ability to gather identifying data. At the
same time, it does not prevent the member states from establishing incom-
patible regulations if reasons of national security so require.26 6
Following the events of September 1 1th, many of the member states of
the European Union concluded that there was no choice but to take far-
reaching measures, some of which entailed a significant infringement of
individuals' rights, to protect Europe against similar attacks. 26 7 Accord-
ingly, in July 2002, the European Parliament adopted the Electronic Com-
munication Privacy Directive, 26 8 which eased a number of the restrictions
on the processing of personal data in the electronic communication sector
but does not bind the member states in the areas of national security and
criminal law. The provisions of the Directive do not prevent the member
states from enacting laws that require the providers of electronic communi-
cation services to collect and store identifying customer data for a variety
of purposes.
However, concurrently, the Directive introduces an important provi-
sion protecting the individual against identification of his precise location
using his cellular telephone, since it requires the communication providers
to inform their customers of the nature of the data being gathered about
their location and the purpose of collecting it. If the customer consents to
the collection of the data, it may be collected only to the extent necessary
to provide the service, and in the absence of consent, the data may only be
collected on an anonymous basis.
Conclusion
We must examine the appropriate scope of protection to grant to the
fundamental right to privacy in times of national emergency on the basis of
our new, more acute understanding. On one hand, we must refrain from
clinging to the false illusion that in such grave times of trouble it is possible
to protect the individual's privacy as if that individual were living in a uto-
pian state of peace and tranquility. The terrorists who strike at us chal-
lenge the democratic liberal paradigm on which our states are founded;
265. Directive 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of December
15, 1997 on the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Tele-
communications Sector.
266. Id. Art. 14.
267. W. Horsley, EU to Push Through Terror Laws, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
world/europe/1689216.stm (last visited Aug. 5, 2003).
268. Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 12,
2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the
Electronic Communications Sector.
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however, at the same time, they make malevolent and iniquitous use of the
freedoms and rights granted to the individual by virtue of that paradigm to
carry out their murderous plans. On the other hand, unlike those in the
past who believed that the ideological struggle between the democratic the-
ory and its challengers had ended with the clear victory of democracy,
26 9
today-after the events of the last century and in particular the transforma-
tion of Germany from a state boasting a long democratic tradition to one
embracing Nazism-we can no longer delude ourselves into thinking that
the ideological battle has ended and that our society is guaranteed an abid-
ing democratic future. On the contrary, we understand the following:
The democratic regimes throughout the world ... are not primeval rock the
existence of which is guaranteed after it is created. Without vigilance and
persistent activity democracies may collapse in a gradual manner and occa-
sionally also in the blink of an eye. We must be aware of this potential for
fragility and understand that it is possible to overcome the danger only by
means of openness and watchfulness and taking a firm stand on safeguard-
ing freedoms.
270
A comparative examination of the balancing formulae between secur-
ity needs and privacy shows that even though, prior to the terrorist attack
on the United States in September 2001, the states referred to in this Arti-
cle had granted the security authorities broad powers to invade a person's
privacy, after that attack all those countries (except Israel) engaged in
hasty and far-reaching legislative changes to these formulae, which signifi-
cantly limited the protection of privacy.
Is it true that the array of checks and balances that previously existed
in these states limited the effectiveness of the tools available to the security
authorities to fight terrorism, and that theijefore the legislative changes
were legitimate and inescapable measures forced on democratic states
seeking to defend themselves? Or, were these measures the outcome of
panic and paranoia lacking any factual basis?
An answer to these questions requires us to examine a number of
points. First, the tool that most seriously denies and restricts freedoms
available to a democratic state is its criminal law, and consequently the
state must use the utmost care to comply with the procedural rules
designed to ensure that the individual against whom this tool is directed
enjoys fair process. 2 7 1 Even though security offenses are at the same time
criminal offenses, the harm they cause to national security, public safety,
and the fabric of social life is much more destructive. Therefore, investiga-
tive powers that cause disproportionate harm to an individual in an ordi-
nary criminal process, such as the imposition of certain restrictions on his
269. F. Fukuyama, The End of History?, in CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD WAR: ARGUMENTS
ON CAUSES OF WAR AND PEACE 5-18 (R.K. Betts ed., 1994).
270. S.N. Eisenstadt, DEMOCRACY AND ITS MEANDERINGS: PARADOXES IN THE MODERN
DEMOCRACY 109 (Ministry of Defense Press 2002) (Heb.).
271. M.H. 3052/99 Barns v. State of Israel (as yet unpublished).
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right to consult with an attorney2 72 or a covert search of his premises or
personal effects are acceptable as a constitutional exception in the security
arena.
In situations when the Israeli legislature (and generally also the Cana-
dian legislature) were careful to refrain from expanding the scope of appli-
cation of the special security legislation to the criminal process as a whole,
the legislatures of the United States and the United Kingdom, prior to the
new antiterrorist acts and even more so subsequently, abstained from
drawing a clear distinction of principle between the two areas. The appli-
cation of the security legislation to ordinary criminal offenses does not
lead rationally to achieving the purpose of the infringement, i.e., preven-
tion of acts of terrorism and therefore violates the individual's right to a fair
criminal trial in a disproportionate manner.
Second, while every power requires the establishment of effective
supervisory mechanisms over how the powers are exercised to ensure that
they are not improperly exploited or used unnecessarily, this requirement
is even more important in security related matters, where the scope of the
powers and the relative ease with which they can be exercised generate
capabilities of a magnitude that greatly exceed those in any other field.
2 7 3
Moreover, the difficulty in defining the term "terror" has led every country
to adopt a broad and vague definition of this concept. While there is no
doubt that the purpose of the vagueness is to ensure that the term will
catch such terrorist organizations as Al Qaeda and Hamas within its net,
the byproduct is that many of the legitimate acts of civil protest carried out
under the banner of freedom of speech and association may fall within its
precincts, 27 4 and therefore it is conceivable that one day political oppo-
nents will pervert the purpose of the vagueness in an effort to neutralize
each another.
Notwithstanding the immense potential risks, and notwithstanding
that establishing restraining and controlling mechanisms (such as substan-
tive, as opposed to symbolic, prior judicial scrutiny, or at least retrospective
scrutiny, or the establishment of supervisory bodies, or the requirement of
periodic reports to ensure public transparency) would not undermine the
effective implementation of the powers, it is apparent that all the states
have on occasion renounced these mechanisms. This is particularly true in
the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. The most extreme and far-
reaching renunciation of the system of checks and balances may be found
in the laws of the United States (first seen in the provisions of the Anti-
272. Section 35 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Powers of Enforcement-Arrests),
5756-1996, S.H. 1592, 338.
273. Zamir, supra note 32, at 22.
274. For a definition "terrorist organization" and "member of a terrorist organization"
in Israel, see the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 5708-1948, Official Gazette, supp.
A, 73; for the definition of "domestic terrorism" in the United States, see USA PATRIOT
Act, supra note 188, § 802 (amending 18 U.S.C 2331); for the definition of "terrorism
offence" in Canada, see Criminal Code, supra note 210, § 2 (amended by Bill C-36); and
for the definition of "terrorism" in the United Kingdom, see Terrorism Act, supra note
244, § 1.
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Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and developed in the Patriot Act)
and in the laws of the United Kingdom (which patently renounced judicial
review in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, followed by further
waivers of checks and balances in the Terrorism Act and the Anti-Terror-
ism, Crime and Security Act).
Third, a system of balances between security and freedom has existed
since time immemorial, although each era has sought to adapt those bal-
ances to the changing reality. Today, technological means are available to
image the body of a person under his clothes, track his movements using
satellite pictures and closed circuit cameras, pinpoint his location with the
aid of beepers or cellular telephones, crosscheck vast quantities of data
relating to the person to determine whether he fits the profile of a potential
terrorist, track his movements on the internet, and engage in multiple other
capabilities, which enable a state to create a detailed and comprehensive
portrait of the lives of its citizens.
While it is inappropriate to latch on to outdated checks and balances
from another era, which would prevent the security authorities from mak-
ing use of technological innovations on grounds of the severe harm caused
to the privacy of masses of innocent persons, the state-if it wishes to be
faithful to its democratic values-cannot permit unrestrained use of these
technologies, even if they have the potential to assist in the prevention of
acts if terrorism. The reason for this is as follows:
It is the fate of democracy that it does not see all means as justified, and not
all the methods adopted by its enemies are open to it. On occasion, democ-
racy fights with one hand tied behind its back. Nonetheless, the reach of
democracy is superior, as safeguarding the rule of law and recognition of the
freedoms of the individual, are important components in its concept of
security. Ultimately, they fortify its spirit, strengthen it and enable it to over-
come its problems.
27 5
The more the measure violates the core aspects of privacy, the more
stringent the inquiry must be into whether it meets the three tests of pro-
portionality, i.e., (a) its compatibility with the purpose of the violation
(thus, for example, a violation of the core aspect of privacy by means of
technological devices of doubtful efficacy and reliability will not be
allowed); (b) whether a measure exists that may achieve the same purpose
by means of a less severe violation (a violation of a core aspect narrows the
zone of proportionality and requires selection of the measure that causes
the minimum harm); and (c) whether a reasonable relationship exists
between the damage caused to the individual as a result of the infringe-
ment of his privacy (the damage is most severe on the core level) and the
public benefit ensuing from achieving the security purpose.2 76
We have seen that a number of arrangements in Israeli law fail to meet
these tests. Regarding comparative law, the events of September 2001 led
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the states discussed here to sharply tilt the scales towards security needs,
on the ground that until that date their checks and balances formulae had
been mistaken and had given excessive weight to the individual's privacy.
In my opinion, this argument is factually unfounded, as our examination
of the statutory amendments has revealed that most of the amendments
did not grant the security authorities new powers but rather removed or
eased the oversight mechanisms of past powers-a process that does not
increase the efficiency of the war against terrorism at all but only creates a
danger of unlawful implementation of those powers.
At the opening of this section I referred to the fragility of democracy
and therefore to the possibility that it will collapse in the absence of suffi-
cient vigilance to ensure its defense.
Emergency times pose a dual challenge to a democracy: on one hand,
it must protect its citizens and ensure their security, and for this purpose it
must restrict their rights. On the other hand, the democracy must safe-
guard itself against blindly sacrificing the values of freedom and justice on
the altar of national security.
This task is not easy, either legally or morally, because in times of
crisis the individual tends to accord greater weight to the collective interest
in security than to individual rights. The legislature-which is an elected
body dependent upon public support-is likely to exploit this temporary
public mandate to engage in unnecessary, destructive, and irreversible vio-
lations of the individual's rights.
As democratic states, "we have always placed our trust in the fact that
here the voice of the law is not silent even in the tumult of the hostility
which surrounds US," 2 7 7 and therefore we must be careful not to enact laws
that turn the individual from an end into a means to achieve the security
objective.
The State of Israel, which , since its establishment, has been contend-
ing with persistent security threats, and the democratic Western states,
which, since September 2001, have understood that they too must live
under the shadow of terrorist threats, have more than once surrendered to
the temptation to see the individual as a tool and consequently to suspend
his right to privacy on imaginary and factually baseless security grounds-
a phenomenon that is particularly noticeable in the United States and the
United Kingdom.
All those who argue that any infringement whatsoever to the privacy
of a person can only be tolerated in times of crisis, and that immediately
upon the arrival of a time of peace, it must be removed are suffering from
self-delusion. The boundary line separating the protection of individuals'
rights in times of emergency and their protection in times of peace is
extremely fine and amorphous, and therefore there is a danger that unnec-
essary restrictions imposed in times of emergency, and their moral impact,
will remain long after the cessation of that emergency, and we will find
ourselves living in an abyss into which we have thrown ourselves
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unnecessarily.
2 78
Particularly in its hour of trouble, against the background of the roar
of the cannon and the scenes of destruction, it is vital for the state to take
honest stock and examine whether it has remained faithful to its demo-
cratic character and to the values for which it is fighting. Without this, at
the end of the battle, when the veil of smoke lifts, we may discover that not
only were the symbols of democracy destroyed by the terrorist attacks but
also democracy itself.
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